WHY A WORLD STATE IS INEVITABLE:

TELEOLOGY AND THE LOGIC OF ANARCHY

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ABSTRACT

Long dismissed as unscientific, teleological explanation has been undergoing something of a revival as a result of the emergence of self-organization theory, which combines micro-level dynamics with macro-level boundary conditions to explain the tendency of systems to develop toward stable end-states. On that methodological basis this article argues that a global monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence – a world state – is inevitable. At the micro-level world state formation is driven by the struggle of individuals and groups for recognition of their subjectivity. At the macro-level this struggle is channeled toward a world state by the logic of anarchy, which generates a tendency for military technology and war to become increasingly destructive. The process moves through five stages, each responding to the instabilities of the one before: a system of states, a society of states, world society, collective security, and the world state. Human agency matters all along the way, but is increasingly constrained and enabled by the requirements of universal subjectivity.

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In this article I propose a teleological theory of the "logic of anarchy" which suggests that a global monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence – a world state – is inevitable (cf. Buzan, Jones, and Little, 1993). Like any structural tendency, the speed with which this one will be realized is historically contingent. At the micro-level the process is neither deterministic nor linear, and forward movement may be blocked for periods of time. There are many pathways by which a world state may be achieved, and human agency matters along every one. In that sense "anarchy is [still] what states make of it" (Wendt, 1992). However, I am not concerned here with historical contingencies or timing. My guess is that a world state will emerge within 100 years, which makes the process potentially relevant to policymakers and scholars today, but nothing below turns on that prediction. Instead, I am concerned with the macro-structure of all pathways, which channel the international system's development toward an inevitable end-state. In that respect the theory is progressivist, although in an explanatory rather than normative sense.

Resistance to progressivist, much less teleological, thinking runs deep within contemporary IR scholarship. Realists are skeptical, arguing that the logic of anarchy is one of endless conflict and war (Waltz, 1979). Liberals are more optimistic, arguing that international institutions, interdependence, and/or democratic states can lead to cooperation and peace within anarchy (Keohane, 1990). However, Liberal progressivism is contingent, not teleological. If institutions are upheld, if interdependence deepens, and/or if democracy spreads, then progress is possible. The forecast is based on extrapolating lawlike regularities from the past into the future, assuming the conditions that created them continue to hold. Since there is no guarantee they will,

we cannot say that any given future is inevitable.

Indeed, if there is one thing almost all social scientists today agree on, from the most hardened positivists to the most radical post-modernists, it is that teleological explanations are illegitimate. To call a theory "teleological" is considered a decisive criticism, with no need even to explain why. At least two factors may account for this dismissal. Intellectually, teleology has been considered unscientific since the triumph of the mechanistic worldview in the 17th century. Politically, it is thought to deny human agency in the social world. In my view both objections are unfounded, and with them *a priori* resistance to teleological thinking about world politics.

To show this, in the first section I synthesize recent attempts to rehabilitate teleological explanation. These efforts span many disciplines – philosophy of science, biology, organization theory, even cosmology – and indicate that, although the scientific status of teleology remains controversial, it is being taken increasingly seriously. One reason is that much of this literature builds on self-organization theory, which is emerging as an important challenge to the orthodox neo-Darwinian theory of evolution.[1] Self-organization theory hypothesizes that order in nature emerges not only through the mechanism of mutation-selection-retention, but "spontaneously" from the channeling of system dynamics by structural boundary conditions toward particular end-states. With a few exceptions this theory has been little noticed by IR scholars,[2] who are just beginning to engage the much older neo-Darwinian tradition.[3] But in the social sciences more generally the idea of self-organization has been around since the "spontaneous order" tradition of the Scottish empiricists, and is getting considerable attention today.[4] Much of this work is not explicitly teleological, and many self-organization theorists might vigorously reject any such a

reading of their approach. On the other hand, many others do see a connection, arguing that self-organization theory can provide a scientific basis for teleological explanation.[5]

Assuming that is possible, the questions for IR become what precisely is the end-state toward which the world system moves, and what is the mechanism by which it gets there? Three end-states suggest themselves: a liberal "pacific federation" of republican states, a realist world of nation-states in which war remains legitimate, and a world state. The first is associated with Kant (1991a; b) and the second with Hegel (1977), both of whom based their projections on explicitly teleological arguments.[6] In rejecting the possibility of a world state, therefore, they agreed that, strictly speaking, anarchy would remain the organizing principle of the system, albeit different kinds of anarchy. As to the mechanism of progress, in different ways Kant and Hegel also both emphasized the role of conflict – Kant in his thesis of man's "unsociable sociability," and Hegel in his theory of the "struggle for recognition."

I am in no position here to engage in an exegesis and critical discussion of Kant and Hegel's arguments. However, since I too see conflict as the mechanism behind the system's development yet conclude that its end-state is not anarchy but a world state, it may be useful to introduce my argument by showing how it departs from theirs. There are three main divergences. One concerns the effects of conflict on state identity. While envisioning a tendency for conflict to generate a world of republican states, Kant did not see it creating a collective identity. His states remain egoists who retain sovereignty. On this score I follow Hegel's analysis of the struggle for recognition, in which egoistic individuality is progressively transformed into collective identity, and eventually a state. A second concerns the units in the struggle for

recognition. The struggle for recognition in Hegel is between individuals, and as a result his "universal state" at the "end of history" is a plurality of states (also see Fukuyama, 1992). Some critics have argued that Hegel's reasoning is inconsistent, and that he should have argued for a world state.[7] Be that as it may, I argue that the struggle for recognition has two levels, one between individuals and one between states (Ringmar, 2002; cf. Honneth, 1996), which will not end as long as the system is anarchic. Finally, there is the role of technology. Kant rejected a world state in part because the technology of his day precluded it (Carson, 1988: 177; Guyer, 2000: 416-7), and in positing an end-state in which war remained legitimate Hegel did not think its costs would become intolerable. Neither anticipated the dramatic technological changes of the past century. As Daniel Deudney (1999; 2000) convincingly argues, these have greatly increased the costs of war and the scale on which it is possible to organize states. In sum, and put in the language of teleological explanation developed below, my argument is that a world state is made inevitable by the interaction between a self-organizing, bottom-up process and a structural, top-down one: struggles for recognition mediated by technological change at the micro-level, conditioned by the logic of anarchy at the macro.

Two caveats. First, it is impossible within the constraints of an article to do justice to both the methodological and substantive issues in this discussion. That might have counseled two separate articles (at least), but given the modern hostility to teleology my theory might be dismissed *a priori* without a defense of its methodology, and the latter might seem arid and unmotivated without an illustration or "plausibility probe." So at the risk of doing both inadequately I have joined them. However, on the assumption that the logic of teleological

explanation will be less familiar and of broader interest than a theory of world state formation, when faced with trade-offs I have opted for preserving discussion of the former, and left the substantive theory more at the level of a sketch, hopefully to be fleshed out in future work. Second, and also for reasons of space, I shall not address the relationship between the logic of anarchy and the "logic of capital," which constitutes a distinct developmental dynamic in the world system. The logic of capital generates distributional struggles that cannot be reduced to the struggle for recognition (Fraser, 2000), and may significantly complicate the latter, but in the long run it too points toward a world state (Chase-Dunn, 1990; Shaw, 2000). As such, I bracket its role here, on the assumption that it would only make a world state "more" inevitable.

In the next section I discuss teleological explanation. I then explain what I mean by the state, including a world state. In the third section I discuss the struggle for recognition, and in the fourth I show how such a struggle within anarchy must inevitably culminate in a world state. In the conclusion I address the question of agency and some implications for grand strategy.

CAUSAL PLURALISM AND TELEOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

In recent years there has been much debate within IR scholarship about what might be called "causal pluralism" (Asma, 1996): whether explanations of world politics can take different forms. The orthodox positivist position, rooted in a Newtonian worldview, is that an explanation always depicts a mechanical relationship between prior conditions and later effects.[8] Other forms of inquiry might be valuable as "descriptive inference" (King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994), but they do not explain. Explanations must be causal, and causation must be mechanical. From this perspective, causal pluralism is either confused about what "explanation" means, or a

threat to science itself. Following interpretivist philosophers of social science, constructivists and post-modernists have argued against causal monism in favor of "constitutive" analyses. Some see their work as yielding "Understanding" and thus outside the "Explaining" paradigm altogether (Hollis and Smith, 1990), whereas others see it as a form of explanation (Ruggie, 1998: 871-4; Wendt, 1998). But all agree that constitutive theories are not merely descriptive, and contribute to social science in ways that cannot be reduced to mechanical causation.

The ultimate issue here is whether different kinds of causes exist in nature.[9] If causal monism is based on the Newtonian worldview, then the prototype for causal pluralism is the Aristotelian worldview that it replaced. Advocates of constitutive theory in IR have not offered an Aristotelian-style defense of their approach.[10] Doing so might be instructive, and suggests that teleological explanation should be added to the debate.

Aristotelians distinguish four kinds of causality. 1) "Efficient" causality refers to a mechanical relationship between a prior cause and a subsequent effect. This is how positivism defines 'causation.' 2) "Material" causality refers to the sense in which an entity or process is caused by having a particular composition. 3) "Formal" causality refers to the way in which the structure of an object or process gives it form. 4) "Final" causality – the key element in teleology – refers to the way in which the purpose or end of a system affects its development. A textbook example of these multiple causes at work is building a house (Ulanowicz, 1997: 12): its efficient cause is the labor of workmen; its material cause is the bricks and mortar of which it is made; its formal cause is the blueprint that gives these materials their eventual form; and its final cause is the purpose of the individuals building it. Significantly, all four causes are seen as necessary to a

complete explanation, and will be at least implicit in any scientific theory. So the issue is not pluralism for pluralism's sake, but in order to obtain a total understanding of a phenomenon.

If the positivist view of explanation presupposes efficient causation, then constitutive analyses offer intriguing parallels to material and formal causation. In IR such arguments have usually been used to highlight the importance of ideas, but material conditions can be constitutive as well. Thus, constitutive theorists have shown how phenomena normally seen as material, such as power, are in fact constituted by ideas ("material" causation). And these ideas exist and have effects because of the discursive forms (norms, institutions, ideologies) in which they are embedded (formal causation). This is not the place to defend the explanatory content of such accounts. The point is only that the *a priori* rejection of their explanatory status assumes causal monism. However, positivists and post-positivists alike reject final causation. If causal pluralism justifies constitutive theory, then perhaps it can do the same for teleology.

Teleological Explanation[11]

Teleological explanations explain by reference to an end or purpose (*telos*) toward which a system is directed. Like other explanations they are answers to a question (Cross, 1991; Wendt 1998), in this case "what is X for?" As such, they often take the grammatical form of "for the sake of" or "in order to" statements: Y is the final cause of X if X happens in order to realize Y.[12] Ever since Francis Bacon, philosophers have tried to discredit such explanations as unscientific, and show that they can always be reduced to mechanical causation. Yet interest in teleology keeps coming back. One reason is a persistent sense that efficient causation cannot fully account for apparent end-directedness in nature, so that some "explanatory structure" is lost if

teleological reasoning is excluded altogether.[13]

The contemporary literature on teleological explanation is not well-organized and often seems to be talking past itself. Two important distinctions underlie this confusion, one between intentional and non-intentional teleological processes (McLauglin, 2001; cf. Mayr, 1982), the other between what I shall call evolutionary and developmental approaches to teleology.

In an intentional teleological process the end toward which a system moves is a goal of a purposive agent, whose desire for an outcome helps bring it about. Final causation here involves goal-seeking, which is found at least in the higher animals, and perhaps all animals. However, the paradigm case is human action, where explanations by reference to reasons (desires and beliefs), as in rational choice theory, may be seen as teleological. Few social scientists think of rational choice theory as teleological, on the assumption that "reasons are [efficient] causes" (see especially Davidson, 1963). But that is very much contested.[14] Many philosophers treat reasons as constitutive and thus formal causes, while others go further, treating them as final causes.[15]

In contrast, in a non-intentional teleological process the end toward which a system moves is constituted by non-conscious "boundary conditions." The paradigm case is ontogeny, the process by which embryos become adults. Here there is no goal-seeking (a kitten does not "seek" to become a cat). But the process is still end-directed, since unless interrupted by disease or death a normal organism will inevitably become an adult. Anti-teleologists argue that this too can be reduced to efficient causation, making appeals to final causation spurious. Teleologists are skeptical, arguing that the end-state toward which organisms move is an essential part of the

explanation of how they get there.

Should world state formation be understood as intentional or non-intentional? That depends on whether it makes sense to attribute intentionality to social systems, and to the world system in particular. While philosophically debatable, the assumption that at least some social systems are intentional is pervasive in IR scholarship, which routinely treats states as purposive actors.[16] I shall make the same assumption, and so at the "micro"-level of states my teleological argument is intentional. However, it is less clear that intentionality characterizes the system as a whole. Since my burden here is already great, at the macro-level I will play it safe and make my argument on non-intentional grounds, speculating only at the end about how the system's history might be retold in intentional terms.

Within the non-intentional category, in turn, there is a distinction between evolutionary and developmental approaches to teleology. They have many similarities, but differ on the central question of what it is that teleological explanations explain.

The evolutionary approach to teleology assumes that when someone asks a "what-for?" question, she wants to know how and why a system acquired certain traits or behaviors (see especially Wright, 1976). The question is about origins, and is answered by giving an etiology of the trait in terms of its consequences for survival. A teleological explanation of zebra stripes, for example, would show how they were functional for the differential retention of zebras in natural selection. A teleological explanation of the modern state system might show how a monopoly of force gave states a competitive advantage against groups without one (cf. Spruyt, 1994). Like neo-Darwinism, therefore, this approach to teleology is backward-looking and concerned with

populations of organisms (hence my "evolutionary" designation). This convergence may seem odd, since neo-Darwinism is strongly anti-teleological. However, evolutionary teleologists argue that neo-Darwinism contains an implicit teleological element that does irreducible explanatory work.[17] This element is hidden in the definition of what will enhance fitness in a given context, which forms the functional principle in terms of which consequences are selected (Machamer, 1977; Short, 1983: 314). In the savannah camouflage is a criterion of fitness, the consequences of which explain zebra stripes, just as in anarchy an advantage in war may explain states.

I will not address the contentious issue of whether a functionalist-teleology is necessary to fill out neo-Darwinism. What matters is that the developmental approach to teleology answers a different question.[18] On this view, "what-for?" questions are asking how some trait or behavior serves the purposes of a larger system. The question here is about how things work, not where they came from. In the biological case this leads to a concern with the maturation of individual organisms, not populations, and it is forward- rather than backward-looking. This is more akin to Aristotle's view of teleology, and indeed, according to developmentalists the evolutionists have completely changed the subject, reducing teleology to a special kind of efficient causation.[19] That may make teleology more palatable to science, but also strips it of much of its interest. Whatever the merits of evolutionary teleology in the abstract, my argument about world state formation is developmental. This offers an interpretation of teleology clearly different than efficient causal explanation, and as such is a strong form of the argument.

As yet there is no authoritative non-intentional, developmental account of teleological explanation. However, the literature consistently points to the interaction of two processes, a

micro or bottom-up process of self-organization, and a macro or top-down process of structural constitution. The former involves efficient causation and the latter formal causation, and as such neither by itself is intrinsically teleological.[20] Final causation emerges from their interaction.

Self-Organization and Upward Causation. The micro-foundations of teleological processes are described by self-organization theory, which shows how order can emerge in a system as a result of the interactions of its elements following purely local rules. Adam Smith's "invisible hand" is perhaps the most well-known example of such a dynamic (Ullman-Margalit, 1978). A more recent example is Thomas Schelling's (1971) classic study of racial segregation. Schelling built a simple model of an initially completely white neighborhood which showed that, if families vary in their tolerance for black neighbors, with some leaving the neighborhood when the first black family moves in, more when two black families move in, and so on, the eventual result will be a wholly black neighborhood, even though almost no white families were opposed *ex ante* to living in an integrated one. Similarly, in his application of complexity theory to world politics, Jervis (1997) reads balance of power theory in self-organizational terms: as a result of decisions taken by individual states in response to purely local threats, a macro-level pattern of balancing emerges and persists over time. In each case, systemic order grows from a bottom-up or "upward causal" process, without central coordination. In this respect self-organization theory has a strong methodological individualist orientation (Epstein and Axtell, 1996: 16-17).

The mechanisms by which order grows are negative and positive feedback (see Jervis, 1997). Negative feedback can work either at the micro-level by punishing individuals' behavior, or at the macro-level through systemic compensation (as in stock market corrections). Both help

to maintain a system's status quo, or "homeostasis," as in the operation of the balance of power in anarchy. Negative feedback has been amply studied by social scientists in the past without the aid of self-organization theory (Witt, 1997: 490-1), and so the theory's value added lies primarily in its emphasis on positive feedback, in which behaviors or effects are amplified by a dynamic of "increasing returns" (Pierson, 2000) or "autocatalysis" (Swenson, 1997).[21] Importantly, when positive feedback effects cross a threshold or "tipping point" the resulting non-linear dynamics can induce system change.

There is nothing intrinsically teleological about negative and positive feedback. Both involve only efficient causation, albeit of a "circular" or "reciprocal" kind, in which X causes Y, Y feeds back causally on X, X stabilizes or reinforces Y, and so on. Self-organization theorists who focus on such feedback dynamics tend not to see their work as teleological. On other hand, many other self-organization theorists do make a connection to teleological explanation, so the status of teleology in the theory is currently unresolved (Hodgson, 2001: 369). The feature of self-organizing systems that raises the question is their apparent end-directedness, which is generated by the interaction of self-organization with macro-level boundary conditions exercising downward causation on a system's parts.

Boundary Conditions and Downward Causation. Just as self-organization theory's bottom-up story is rooted in methodological individualism, the top-down story is rooted in methodological holism. Holism describes systems that have a structural integrity constituting them as irreducible totalities, or more than the sum of their parts (Wendt, 1999: chapter 4). This integrity stems from macro-level organizing principles or boundary conditions, which separate a

system from its environment and impose a degree of "closure" on its internal processes.[22] These boundary conditions may be organic (like DNA) or social (like cultures of anarchy below). What both types share is that they encode information at the system level. This does not mean that the system exists wholly separate from its elements, just that it is not reducible to them. Parts and whole are mutually constitutive: parts only have the identity they do in virtue of the whole (one cannot be a slave if there is no slavery), and the whole cannot exist without its parts. Holism implies a hierarchy of interdependent levels, with each having its own causal powers.[23]

The conventional view of the relationship between levels involves only upward causation: the interaction of elements at the micro-level generates patterns at the macro. Such reductionism assumes that all causation is mechanistic, and may be why many self-organization theorists see their work in non-teleological terms. Armed with a concept of formal causation, however, we can make sense of the holist claim that systems have a top-down explanatory role. A familiar example of formal causation in world politics is the way in which the norms of the Westphalian system constitute states with sovereignty, an irreducibly social status with rights and obligations that would not exist without those norms. This example describes a static effect of systems. A more dynamic formal causal effect is captured by the concept of "downward causation."

Downward causation refers to the way in which boundary conditions govern the interaction of a system's parts.[24] The "governing" here is conservative, geared to system maintenance: once a system has become a structured totality, its boundary conditions help it to survive. They do this by constituting constraints on interaction (Juarrero, 1999: 131-150). The information within boundary conditions defines what kinds of interactions are inconsistent with

the operation of a system, and on this basis the system selects for the behavior and survival of its parts, which "determine[s] in part the distribution of lower level events and substances."[25] The "in part" here is an important qualification, since there are often many ways to satisfy system requirements – a phenomenon known as "multiple realizability" – the choice of which occurs at the micro-level.[26] To that extent the effect of macro-level constraints will be "weak" (ibid: 126). But this does not undermine the larger point that by virtue of their boundary conditions, systems are able to monitor and intervene in their own functioning to sustain themselves.[27] This process cannot operate without an efficient causal mechanism and as such it depends on interactions at the micro-level (cf. Elster, 1982). But it is not reducible to the latter, since efficient causation requires the separate existence of cause and effect. In a structured totality parts and whole are mutually constitutive, which means their interaction cannot be mechanical (Emmeche, et al., 2000: 25; Juarrero, 1999: 133).

A useful way to think about downward causation is in terms of a "program."[28] The conventional view of explanation is "process"-oriented: we explain X by identifying the micro-level process that caused it. Often this approach is sufficient, but in situations where an outcome is multiply realizable it will fail to capture relevant explanatory facts and as such lack "causal depth" (Meyerling, 2000: 190; R. Wilson, 1994). Although he does not use this terminology, a good example in IR scholarship is Waltz's (1979) theory of how anarchy causes balancing. A process theory of balancing would look to the micro-level at how individual states perceived and reacted to threats. Such a theory would tend to see balancing as intentional. In contrast, Waltz looks to the macro-level at how the anarchic structure of the international system "selects" for

balancing: over time states that fail to balance are simply eliminated, leaving only balancers.[29] Importantly, his theory is multiply realizable at the micro-level, and in particular does not require that states intend to balance or even are aware of the system's logic. In effect, the anarchy "program" controls what kinds of efficient causal pathways get activated, enabling Waltz to introduce a higher-level explanatory taxonomy that simplifies the data relative to process-explanations, and from which we can derive testable hypotheses.[30]

End-Directedness and Final Causation. Teleological explanation depends on the interaction of bottom-up and top-down causation, but requires one more element. Downward causation is biased toward homeostasis and so does not explain change, and self-organization theory's upward causal focus on non-linear dynamics does not explain its direction. What is missing is an explanation of the tendency of structured totalities to progress toward a state of "completed development" (Jacobs, 1986: 51). To get this we need to add final causation to the picture, which refers to the role of end-states in channeling system dynamics toward certain outcomes. It is the interaction of all three forms of causation (along with material causation, which is implicit in this discussion) that constitutes teleological processes.[31]

Self-organization theory refers to end-states as "attractors," which come in four types: fixed-point (corresponding to the idea of equilibrium in economics), periodic, quasi-periodic, and chaotic.[32] Each represents a distinct pattern toward which a system will move and lock into, after which it settles down into a self-sustaining logic. We might say that the system is then organized as opposed to organizing, even though an ongoing process is necessary for its continued survival. Which attractor characterizes a given system depends on its boundary

conditions. Waltz's claim that anarchy tends toward balancing (and thus continued anarchy) implies a fixed-point attractor, as does my claim that it tends toward a world state.

A common way to think about the explanatory role of end-states is that events at the micro-level are selected by a system in relation to its future states.[33] As such, a specification of an end-state is essential to a complete theory of a system's development over time, without which we lose some explanatory power. Imagine trying to explain the development of an organism without a conception of what it will look like as an adult – clearly something would be missing from such an account. With end-states added to the picture, therefore, we get an understanding of how a system governs not just the reproduction but also the directed becoming of its parts.

Since much of the modern hostility to teleology stems from misunderstandings of the explanatory role of end-states, let me briefly address two. First, it does not mean that the future causes the present, or "backward causation." It is not the end-state itself that generates a stable outcome, but the systemic boundary conditions that constitute an end-state which do. Thus, the real issue here is the legitimacy of holism and downward causation (McLaughlin, 2001: 27), not whether the future has causal powers. Second, skeptics have often complained that since the ultimate end-state of all organisms is death, teleology implies the absurd claim that death is the purpose of life. This too is mistaken. Death is not an end-state, since a dead system no longer exists and so is not in any "state" at all. End-states are defined by the stage at which a system has completed its development, not by what happens after it does so. That all organisms die proves only that they eventually lose their battle to sustain themselves.[34]

What precisely is it that causes systems to develop toward their end-states? The general answer is instability (Buss, 1987). As we saw above, the boundary conditions of self-organizing systems select among their elements for behaviors and properties that are consistent with system maintenance, but this process is not deterministic, since there are usually many ways to maintain a system. As such, there is always a lot going on at the micro-level that is not controlled by the macro. These goings on will periodically generate dynamics that threaten a system's viability. A system will respond to such threats by elaborating its structure – encoding new information in its boundary conditions – so as to further constrain its elements. Insofar as that stabilizes the system for a period of time it will constitute a "local" attractor or temporary "end-state." However, with each elaboration of structure new sources of instability may be created at the micro-level, to which the system responds with further elaboration, which may create yet more instabilities, and so on in step-wise fashion until a "global" attractor or "final" end-state is reached. At that point the system's dynamics become self-enforcing (again, think equilibrium in economics), with no endogenously constituted deviation possible. In a sense, then, the logic here is "running to stand still," with movement in a progressive direction until a system need run no more.

The fact that development toward end-states involves a suppression of destabilizing interactions at the micro-level is one reason why critics worry about the implications of systemic teleologies for human agency (cf. Peled, 2000). I will return to this issue in the conclusion, but a few remarks are called for here. It is true that because development by its nature is a movement from indeterminacy to determinacy (Salthe and Matsuno, 1995: 329), or entropy to organization,

there is a reduction in the scope for agency overall. In a world state, for example, agents lose the freedom to make war unilaterally. Yet, in two key respects agency is preserved in teleological explanations. First, the multiple realizability of end-states means that considerable room for agency exists in choosing the precise path by which the system develops. Second, the loss of some agency at the micro-level may create agency at the macro-level.[35] By taking war off the agenda, a world state would create capacities for collective action that its members could never realize in an anarchy.

Falsifying Teleological Explanations. Little attention has been given in the literature to how one knows when a teleological explanation is wrong, but as a general rule two kinds of evidence seem important. One is for the deep structures or boundary conditions that are thought to generate end-directed development in a system. Such structures will often be unobservable and so accessible only indirectly, but in this respect teleological claims are no harder to falsify than any structural explanation.[36] The other is evidence that a system's development consistently results in a certain end-state. If so, then reference to the latter will be an essential and irreducible part of what explains its development. In biology this criterion is easy to satisfy, since we can directly observe the life course of organisms. However, that is not possible in IR, since the world system has presumably has not reached its end-state. That raises a hard epistemological problem: how can we know whether a world state is inevitable before the system gets there?

There is no easy solution to this problem, but at least three kinds of empirical evidence could nevertheless bear on my claims. The first is the history of the international system to date.

Do we observe a tendency for political authority to consolidate into larger units? Of interest here is Robert Carneiro's (1978) estimate that in 1000 B.C. there were 600,000 independent political communities on the earth, whereas today there are less than 200. Notwithstanding the difficulties of counting "states" 3000 years ago, and their increase in the 20th century due to decolonization, the overall trend is striking and prima facie evidence for some kind of developmental process.[37] The second is histories of existing states, which can be seen as local attractors in regional sub-systems. Although these sub-systems may be more open than the world system and thus more vulnerable to exogenous shocks, if my theory of world state formation is right their development should be explicable at least in part by the same logic. Finally, one might simulate the argument with a computational model and see if it generates the predicted result. Cederman's (1997; 2001) work is instructive in this regard. Although not explicitly teleological or addressed to the causal mechanism proposed below (the struggle for recognition), in it one also sees developmental tendencies in anarchy. None of this evidence may be decisive given the difficulties of knowing the world system's end-state from "inside history," but that at least some evaluation is possible suggests that what follows should be seen as a "scientific" conjecture.

In sum, teleological explanation involves four distinct kinds of causation: material, efficient/upward, formal/downward, and final. I turn now to an application of this reasoning to the world system. Since I have elsewhere argued for the centrality of ideas in constituting world politics (Wendt, 1999), I shall bracket the material causation story below. In the next two sections I focus on the micro side of the argument, after which I turn to the macro side.

DEFINING THE STATE

The first step in the model is to specify the parts of the system. Ultimately these are individuals, but historically individuals first organized themselves into largely autonomous political communities, and it is through that medium that they have mostly interacted within the world system at large. As such, there are two "levels" of parts in the system, individuals and groups, both of which play important roles in the story. In this section I define the main political groups in today's system (states), which will in turn allow me to define what I mean by a world state. I will say more about individuals in the next section.

Politically autonomous groups have taken many forms – tribes, city-states, leagues, states, and so on – but over time this variety has been whittled down such that the dominant form today is the territorial state. If my theory of world state formation is correct this convergence was itself inevitable. However, I shall not argue that here (cf. Spruyt, 1994), since it is not essential to the theory that states be the only groups in the system today. It is enough that states are dominant, which permits a simplifying assumption that the relevant groups at the system level are states.[38]

Following Weber (1978), I define the state as an organization possessing a monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence within a society.[39] This definition has four aspects that are important to my argument.

The first is a monopoly of force. This means that the potential for organized violence is unified in the sense that those controlling its exercise cannot make decisions independent of each other, but always operate as a "team."[40] With Hobbes (1968), let's call this "common power."

The second aspect is legitimacy. Those subject to a common power must perceive its existence and operation as right. Legitimacy is constituted by a structure of political authority that empowers some people to enforce the rules and obligates others to obey (cf. Benjamin and Duvall, 1985: 25-6). Importantly, it is constituted not by the state itself but by members of society, who "surrender private judgment" over the enforcement of social order to a common power (Blau, 1963: 307). That precludes from being states groups that maintain a monopoly of force solely through violence and coercion, like armed gangs or despotic empires. Given that constraint, however, the precise basis of state legitimacy can vary. Monarchies, democracies, communist states, even charismatic dictatorships – in certain historical circumstances all could be seen as legitimate by their subjects. This matters below because a "Weberian state" need not satisfy the more stringent criterion of a "Hegelian state," namely equal recognition of all its members. All Hegelian states are Weberian states, but not all Weberian states are Hegelian states. Given my subsequent emphasis on the struggle for recognition, therefore, I will in effect be arguing that we will get a Weberian world state by creating a Hegelian one.

Common power and legitimacy together constitute the third aspect, sovereignty, understood as the exclusive right to enforce the law of the land. This right is first and foremost an internal right conferred by society. It might also be recognized by other states in a "society of states" ("external" sovereignty), but this is not essential to stateness. In Carl Schmitt's (1985) view, sovereignty comes down to the ability to decide unilaterally that certain individuals or groups are not part of the community and so may if necessary be killed. The lack of accountability of such decisions will emerge below as a key driver in world state formation.

Finally, the state is a corporate actor or subject. This actor is made up of many individuals and as such is also a structure, but the particular characteristics of this structure constitute a collective intentionality, an ability of its members to act consistently as a team or "plural subject" (Gilbert, 1989).[41] What makes corporate subjectivity possible? Self-interest and coercion clearly play a role. If individuals do not perceive a state as in their interest it will not last long, and if they take up arms against the state it will coerce them. But a stable structure of collective intentionality requires more, a shared belief among its members that they constitute a collective identity or "We," to which they are willing to subordinate their private judgment. The result is a "group mind," in which individuals define their identities and interests in terms of membership in a group (D. Wilson, 1994; R. Wilson, 1997).[42] This enables them to engage in routinized collective action that they otherwise could not, and it is this collective action which constitutes group subjectivity. In short, the state's subjectivity is irreducible to the individual subjects of which it is composed (it is "emergent"), even while they retain some individuality. Like individuals, therefore, states are capable of goal-seeking behavior.

On this definition a world state is clearly some ways off, and would require three fundamental changes to the current world system.[43] The first is the emergence of a universal security community: members of the system must no longer routinely perceive each other as physical threats, and expect to settle their disputes peacefully (Adler and Barnett, eds., 1998). This does not mean that an enforcement mechanism would be superfluous, since there is always the possibility of "crime," but a generalized security dilemma would not exist. The second is universal collective security: if crime does occur, other members of the system must act as if a

threat to one is a threat to all. Together these two changes would create a global common power. The third is universal supranational authority: a procedure legitimate in the eyes of world society for making binding decisions about organized violence. This would require territorial states to surrender sovereignty at least in the security domain, and as such goes beyond both collective security and Kant's pacific federation, in which states retain sovereignty and decisions to help others are therefore voluntary. As in territorial states today, cooperation with a world state would be mandatory and enforceable.

Given the magnitude of such changes, a Weberian criterion constitutes a "hard case" for any claim that a world state is inevitable.[44] That can be seen as a virtue of my argument, since a non-Weberian approach, especially one that relaxes the monopoly of force requirement, could suggest that a world state is already here or just around the corner (cf. Shaw, 2000). To give my conjecture bite, it makes sense to define the world state in a way that does not make the argument too easy. But in light of the internationalization of political authority that is already occurring in the system without a centralization of force – in the form of the UN, EU, WTO, ICC, IMF, and so on – it also raises the question of whether a Weberian approach unnecessarily constrains our imagination about what a future global political architecture might look like. Perhaps it won't be a "state" at all, but a "pacific federation," "polity" (Ougaard and Higgott, eds., 2002), or "neo-medieval" system (Friedrichs, 2001), in which a monopoly of force is unnecessary. Perhaps, but in my view these will constitute transitional forms. I argue below that the political development of the system will not end until the subjectivity of all individuals and groups is recognized by a global Weberian state. The key problem for any other architecture is unauthorized violence by

"rogue" Great Powers. Until Great Power violence is accountable the system will be prone to instability, and so will continue its development until the common power requirement is met.

Lest I be accused of lacking imagination, however, it should be emphasized that the systemic changes needed for a world state could be fulfilled in various ways, and so a world state might look very different than states today. In particular, it could be much more decentralized, in three respects. First, it would not require its elements to give up local autonomy. Collectivizing organized violence does not mean that culture, economy, or local politics must be collectivized. Second, it would not require a single UN army. As long as a structure exists that can command and enforce a collective response to threats, a world state could be compatible with the existence of national armies, to which enforcement operations might be sub-contracted (along the lines of NATO perhaps). Finally, it would not even require a world "government," if by this we mean a unitary actor with one person at the top whose individual decisions are final (cf. Bull's [1977] "domestic analogy"). As long as binding choices can be made, decision-making in a world state could involve broad-based deliberation in a "strong" public sphere rather than command by one person (Mitzen, 2001). In short, as long as it has a common power, legitimacy, sovereignty, and subjectivity we should not prejudge the form a world state might take. The EU is already not far from meeting these requirements on a regional level. Were a "completed" EU-like structure to be globalized it would be a world state.

In sum, it may be useful to relate this view of the state to the teleological terms of the previous section. A territorial state exists in virtue of the ongoing interaction of its members, which creates the state through upward causation. This interaction is structured by boundary

conditions – internally in the form of enforceable rules and legitimacy, externally in the form of territorial limits that impose some closure on the system – which through downward causation constitute the state as a distinct entity and help sustain it. And as a self-organized system it has reached an at least temporary end-state of completed development.

THE STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION

Since states historically have always existed in the plural, the emergence of a world state requires the transformation of state identities to a global basis. This task is complicated by the fact that territorial states are local attractors. To be sure, they are always in process, maintained by practices of "domestic" and "foreign policy" that constitute them as distinct units (Campbell, 1992; Jackson and Nexon, 1999), but these practices sustain homeostatic logics that may be very hard to change.[45] Nevertheless, I argue that a world of territorial states is not stable in the long run. They may be local equilibria, but they inhabit a world system that is in disequilibrium, the resolution of which leads to a world state. The mechanism that generates this end-directedness is an interaction between "struggles for recognition" at the micro-level and "cultures of anarchy" at the macro. In this section I address the former and in the next the latter.

The struggle for recognition is about the constitution of individual and group identities and thus ultimately about ideas, but it is mediated by material competition. Since the material aspect of the story has already been partly told by Deudney, and might be thought sufficient to generate a world state, I begin there as a way of showing the necessity of the identity aspect. I do so, however, under the assumption that they form an integrated whole.

Material Competition

The material aspect of the struggle for recognition relates to the Hobbesian justification for territorial states.[46] However, in the hands of Hobbes and most realists it points more toward the inevitability of continued anarchy than a world state.[47] Only with Herz (1957) do we find a clear realist argument for the eventual transcendence of the state, which Deudney (1999; 2000) has systematized in his thesis of "nuclear one-worldism."[48] Neither Herz nor Deudney make the teleological claim that a world state is inevitable, and by themselves their arguments cannot sustain such a view. But they do provide an essential piece of the puzzle.

Hobbes (1968) justified the state on the grounds that only through obedience to a "common power" could individuals escape the "nasty, brutish, and short" life in the state of nature. Obedience to a common power is necessary because of the physical equality of men: their endowments are sufficiently alike that even the weak can kill the strong. Since all are vulnerable, it is in everyone's interest to accept the security provided by a state. The argument is in effect a rationalist one of costs and benefits. Death being the ultimate cost, the expected utility of obeying the state is greater than that of enduring the state of nature. Yet, Hobbes also argued that this reasoning did not apply between states. States are not as vulnerable to being "killed" as individuals, and so the state of nature they face is not as intolerable. This asymmetry undercuts realist descriptions of world politics as "Hobbesian" (Heller, 1982; cf. Mearsheimer, 2001), but also seems to justify realist skepticism that anarchy would lead to a world state.

Deudney challenges this conclusion by arguing that the scale on which it is functional for states to provide security is related to the destructiveness of coercive technology. As changes in

the "forces of destruction" increase the "violence interaction capacity" in the system, the cost and scale of war rises (at least among equals), and with this change it becomes efficient for the size of states to expand as well (Deudney, 2000). A common example of this logic at work is the way in which the invention of gunpowder and artillery helped monarchs in late medieval Europe defeat feudal lords and expand their territories. The resulting territorial states were efficient for many centuries, but with the advent of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons they are now themselves becoming obsolete. Missiles can easily penetrate the boundaries of states, and when combined with nuclear weapons enable an aggressor to "kill" a state in one quick blow. Compared to the "billiard ball" pre-nuclear state, states in a nuclear world are more like "eggs," whose shells are easily shattered by determined attack (Deudney, 1995: 228). In these material conditions states are no longer able to provide security for their inhabitants, and are as vulnerable as individuals in the state of nature. Hence "nuclear one-worldism": just as the risks of the state of nature made it functional for individuals to submit to a common power, the growing destructiveness of military technology and war make it functional for states to do so as well.[49]

Despite its apparently end-directed character, Deudney's theory locates the primary cause of integration outside the states system, in exogenous changes in technology (1999: 108). These changes are contingent and transmitted to the system in efficient causal fashion, and so he rightly cautions that even though it is becoming functional for security to be organized on a global scale, this does not mean it will necessarily happen. In short, he does not attribute a telos to the system, and as such defends only the "probability" of integration, not its inevitability (ibid: 102).

However, by bringing in the security dilemma we can show that technological

development is (also) endogenous to the system, giving its material aspect a teleological logic. States often cannot trust each other's intentions, and since in an anarchic world there is no third party upon whom they can count to defend them, they are forced to rely on their own resources to deal with threats. The result is the familiar arms race "spiral": even if it harbors no aggressive intentions, a state fearful of its neighbors is forced to arm itself, forcing its equally untrusting neighbors to arm, threatening the first state more, and so on. Such competitive militarization has often been merely quantitative in character, which might not affect the scale on which security is functional. But the security dilemma also creates an incentive for qualitative competition (downward causation), since a technological lead may confer advantage in war. Not all states will act on that incentive, but those that do develop new technologies will gain an advantage, which other states will then imitate, and so on, thereby ratcheting up the minimum technology necessary for security. In this way the system itself generates a tendency for technology and war to become more destructive over time, and with it upward pressure on the optimal scale of states.

It might be thought that this material dynamic is enough by itself to make a world state inevitable, but that is not the case, for two reasons. First, as Gregory Kavka (1987: 304) points out, the condition of states in a nuclear world differs in a critical respect from that of individuals in a state of nature: Mutual Assured Destruction means that a nuclear aggressor cannot expect to survive a war. Thus, even though states are vulnerable to being "killed" by nuclear attack, if we assume they are not suicidal then we can also expect them to be deterred by credible threats of retaliation. By holding the costs of intolerable war at bay, MAD ensures that the vulnerability of

states in anarchy is not as desperate as that of individuals, which means they may prefer a nuclear stand-off to giving up sovereignty to a world state (as we saw in the Cold War).

A second problem is linked by Kavka to an under-appreciated feature of Hobbes' story. Hobbes used his theory to justify obedience to an existing state (by warning people what would happen if they did not obey), not to justify creating a new one out of the state of nature. It was a retrospective theory. This matters because even if we accept Hobbes' rationale for obeying an existing state, when used prospectively – which is the way it must figure in a theory of world state formation – his theory is vulnerable to a serious collective action problem. The fact that it might be collectively rational for everyone to submit to a common power does not mean that it is rational for an individual actor to do so. In anarchy people might not trust each other enough to form a state, even if that results in a sub-optimal world. For such insecure actors, it is only after the state is created that it becomes rational to sign the social contract, since only then can they trust it to be enforced. Moreover, even if individuals in the state of nature submit to a common power, what guarantees the security of its members (individual soldiers and police) from each other? They face the same problem that people in the state of nature do: each is armed and so a potential threat to the others, and there is no still higher power to contain this threat. (Appealing to the authority of the sovereign will not do, since in Hobbes' theory this depends ultimately on a monopoly of force, the possibility of which is precisely what is at issue). Used prospectively, in short, Hobbes' theory leads to an infinite regress and so cannot make a world state inevitable, even though it might be functional after the fact.

What is missing from the materialist theory of world state formation is an account of

identity change. It assumes that actors in the pre-state situation are essentially the same as actors in the post-state: rational, self-interested maximizers. What changes with the emergence of the state are only the costs and benefits of complying with the rules, not the identities and interests of its subjects. The same assumption underlies Kant's rejection of the world state. Even though democratic states trust each other enough to achieve perpetual peace, their identity as sovereign, egoistic actors facing a logic of contract does not change.[50] Thus, to argue that a world state is inevitable, we need an account of why the boundaries of state identity will expand to include all people, not just erstwhile fellow citizens.

The Struggle for Recognition

Like Neorealism mine is a structural theory. However, to generate any movement in a structural theory we have to assume that actors want something, so that at the micro-level there has to be a goal-seeking element (and thus intentional teleology). Neorealists assume that above all else people want physical security,[51] which means that what the logic of anarchy is "about" is a struggle for security. I agree that people want security. However, I think people also want recognition. That means that the logic of anarchy is also about a struggle for recognition, and indeed the latter may account for much of the *realpolitik* behavior that realists attribute to the struggle for security (Fukuyama, 1992: 255). The struggle for recognition has two levels, inter-individual and inter-state, but first let me address the desire for recognition in general.

The precondition for any act of recognition is a simple fact of difference or "alterity." Individuals are given as different by virtue of their bodies, and groups are given as different by virtue of the boundaries they draw between themselves and outsiders.[52] These facts may or may

not be recognized by other actors. Recognition refers to the investment of difference with a particular meaning: another actor ("the Other") is constituted as a subject with a legitimate social standing in relation to the Self. This standing implies an acceptance of normative constraints on how the Other may be treated, and a need to give reasons if they must be violated. Actors that are not recognized, like a slave or an enemy in the state of nature, have no such social protection, and so may be killed or violated as one sees fit.

The risk to life and limb of being unrecognized is one reason why actors might have a "desire" for recognition, but there is more to it than simply physical security, for it is through recognition by an Other that the Self is constituted. We can see this dependence of the Self on the Other in our everyday identities: one cannot be a teacher without recognition by students, a husband without recognition by a wife, a citizen without recognition by other citizens. But the point is general, going all the way down to the constitution of subjectivity itself. In the state of nature there is no genuine subjectivity, just the "natural solipsism" of animals (Williams, 1997: ??). Only through recognition can people acquire and maintain a distinct identity. One becomes a Self, in short, via the Other: subjectivity depends on inter-subjectivity. Insofar as people want to be subjects, therefore, they will desire recognition. That said, an important and perhaps counter-intuitive implication of the recognition theory of subjectivity is that recognition also constitutes a collective identity, since recognition makes the Other <u>part</u> of how the Self is defined (Wendt, 1999: chapter 7). One cannot be recognized as different without also being recognized as at some level the same (cf. Brewer, 1991).

There are at least two kinds of recognition, "thin" and "thick."[53] Thin recognition means

being acknowledged as an independent subject within a community of law. To be recognized in this way is to have the juridical status of a sovereign person rather than being just an extension of someone else (like a child or slave), or freedom in Hegel's positive, socially constituted sense. Thus, thin recognition is not about freedom from constraints, but about being seen by others as a legitimate locus of needs and agency – as a "subject" rather than an "object." It implies rights in relation to a community that everyone is obligated to respect, and as such should be enforceable. In contrast, thick recognition means being respected or esteemed by significant Others, such as being seen as smart, virtuous, part of the in-crowd, and so on. It does not involve rights, nor can a community enforce it. Both kinds of recognition constitute forms of subjectivity, and both can be sources of conflict if they are not satisfied (Honneth, 1996). However, only thin recognition is relevant to my argument, since thick recognition cannot be created by a state. Thus, when I use the term 'recognition' below I shall always mean thin recognition.

The desire for recognition is about wanting acknowledgement by the Other as an independent subject, not necessarily about extending recognition to the Other. As such, for any particular actor the desire can in principle be satisfied either symmetrically or asymmetrically: by recognition of the Other's equality, or by securing the Other's recognition without reciprocating it. For Hegel, a properly formed state is constituted by the former.[54] As a definition of the state this goes beyond Weber's monopoly of legitimate force, which can exist without recognition of equality (e.g. the American Confederacy or many states today). This reflects Hegel's teleological view that the end of the state is not just to protect its members' physical security, but to make their subjectivity possible, which cannot be fully realized until all are recognized as subjects. To

be sure, there is mutual recognition of equality in the family and civil society, so even in Hegel's terms it does not by itself make a state. What distinguishes the Hegelian state as a form of mutual recognition is its membership – all citizens of a (national) community of law – and the fact that unlike the family and civil society, it is an impartial judge with the ability to guarantee recognition by punishing people who break the law (Baynes, 2002: 6). In such a state the desire of all actors for recognition is satisfied, and we can therefore expect it to be highly stable.

The case of asymmetric recognition is more problematic, and central to my subsequent argument. Inequality of recognition exists in various degrees, from the extreme of slavery, in which recognition is not mutual at all (the slave is merely an appendage of the master), to more subtle forms like *ancien regime* France, in which recognition is mutual but unequal (peasants have some subjectivity, but less than nobles). But what all such hierarchies share is that one actor satisfies its desire for recognition by denying full recognition to another (Fukuyama, 1992: 163, 182). In a hypothetical world where anything was possible, being the dominant party in a relationship of unequal recognition might be an actor's first choice, since their basic desire is to <u>be</u> recognized, and reciprocating that recognition to the Other means accepting limitations on the Self. This suggests a basis in recognition theory for the belief of some realists that human beings are driven by an inherent will to power (Nietzsche, 1989) or *animus dominandi* (Morgenthau, 1946).[55] By the same token, however, those not fully recognized will struggle for it as best they can, which makes any social order founded on unequal recognition unstable in the long run.

The sources of instability are both material and ideational. Materially it can be costly to suppress desires for recognition. If people are denied something of fundamental importance to

themselves their acceptance of a regime is likely to be half-hearted and dependent on coercion, which even Hobbes recognized was a less efficient and stable basis for order than legitimacy.[56] Of course, in a given historical conjuncture even people who are not recognized may perceive a regime as "legitimate" (more in a moment), but once their desire for recognition is activated into open resistance stability will be costly to maintain. And on the ideational side too there is a long-term threat, rooted in the logic of recognition itself. Even though A's desire to be recognized by B is not in itself a reason for A to reciprocate, Hegel argues that recognition founded solely on coercion – his example is the master-slave relationship – is ultimately unsatisfying, because the failure to recognize the slave calls the master's own subjectivity into question.[57] Recognition is only valuable if it comes from someone perceived as having worth and dignity, and since the slave is not his recognition of the master is ultimately "worthless" (Williams, 1997: ##). Thus, the only way to secure fully stable recognition from the Other is to reciprocate it. In Hegel's view this is a precondition for freedom: one can only be free if recognized as such, and that recognition is only valuable if it is freely given.[58]

On the other hand, the fact that unequal recognition may be costly to sustain, or that recognition from a slave is "ultimately" worthless, does not mean that it cannot appear highly stable, and even legitimate in the eyes of subordinate actors. And of course historically this is what we observe: unequal political orders – "non-Hegelian Weberian states" – that survived for long periods of time. However, if we consider the sources of stability in such orders we can see that this does not militate against the importance of the desire for recognition.

At the micro-level, recognition is not the only desire at work in the system: physical

security is another, which may induce actors to put their lives before recognition.[59] It might be thought that security is more fundamental, on the grounds that one cannot enjoy recognition if one is dead. But the desire for recognition doesn't work that way. As a precondition for genuine subjectivity recognition is part of what makes security worth having in the first place, and people will often sacrifice their lives for it. Suicide bombers are the extreme case, but it seems hard to explain anyone's willingness to fight in a war or participate in a revolution without appealing to their desire for recognition. On the other hand, it is equally clear that people will often not risk their lives for recognition. In Nietzsche's (1989) view this is the choice made by the slave, which he therefore saw as characteristic of the "slave morality."[60] So my claim is only that the desire for recognition is on par with security, not that it always trumps. In addition, there is the factor of hegemony and "false consciousness." People might have been socialized to think they do not deserve recognition, or that it is unthinkable for someone in their position. However, this does not mean that people do not fundamentally want it. The need might not be subjectively perceived, but it could still be an objective interest (Wendt, 1999: 231-33), which, when activated or given an opportunity for expression, will motivate actors to struggle for it. The possibility of hegemony, in turn, points toward the role of macro-level structures of physical and social power in stabilizing unequal recognition. States are homeostatic systems that exert downward causation on their members. This causation "disciplines" people to stay within the boundary conditions of the state most of the time of their own accord, and authorizes violence by state agents when they don't. If we add to this the collective action problems facing would-be revolutionaries, it is clear that even if actors actively want recognition at the micro-level they may be unable to challenge

the macro-stability of a system in a given historical conjuncture.

These micro and macro sources of stability may enable structures of unequal recognition to survive for long periods of time. What I need to show, therefore, is not that desires for recognition never encounter resistance or are always successful, but that in the long run they undermine systems that do not satisfy them.

I turn now to the two levels on which struggles for recognition take place. Given that human beings first organized themselves into autonomous groups, the struggle for recognition is not just about recognition as an individual in the abstract, but as a member of a particular group. Such recognition is a constitutive aspect of individual identity, since it is through groups that individuals historically have acquired subjectivity. Individual attachment to groups, manifested today in nationalism, is a reflection of this fact. People do not easily shed national loyalties even if other groups are available as substitutes. This "embeddedness" of individuals within groups is a key principle of communitarianism (Sandel, 1982). Liberals are more ambivalent. Probably speaking for many liberals, Fukuyama (1992: 201) argues that deep attachments to collective identities like the nation are "irrational." Yet, in that case it is puzzling that for him history will end in a world of sovereign states. If history is an unfolding of Reason, why would it stop before attachments to national sovereignty had been overcome? On the other hand, some other liberals have accommodated a constitutive role for groups in individual identity (Tamir, 1993; Kymlicka, 1995; Linklater, 1998). Like communitarians, they see group attachments as both natural and normatively valuable.

The fact that human beings are initially attached to different groups has two important

implications for struggles for recognition. First, within the system as a whole people confront each other not only as individuals but as members of groups, and so the struggle for recognition is mediated by group boundaries. This is true both within and between groups. Internally, the struggle for recognition implies that those from whom recognition is sought are merely other members of the group, not individuals everywhere. Indeed, a distinction between members and non-members is often constitutive of domestic recognition struggles, since participation in a privileged status vis-à-vis outsiders may be one of the reasons that insiders seek recognition in the first place. Externally, the struggle for recognition is mediated by group boundaries in the sense that even once it is complete within a group, individuals still face the problem that people in other groups do not recognize them. Territorial state sovereignty, in other words, is by its very nature a structure of unequal recognition. As a result, outsiders are denied rights and may even be killed not because of who they are as individuals, but simply because they are members of a different group. In that respect the members of sovereign states suffer a "common fate" (Wendt, 1999: 349-353). This may have little salience for individuals as long as their state can protect them from war, but as long as war is a possibility their recognition will be incomplete.

Second, like individuals, groups too have a desire for recognition, in this case corporate recognition. This desire exists only in virtue of their members' desires to secure the conditions for <u>their</u> subjectivity, but because those conditions involve common fate, if a group's subjectivity is not recognized by other groups, then its members will not be recognized either. To that extent groups' desire for recognition is relatively autonomous from, or supervenient on, the desire for individual recognition.[61] Note that this does not mean that groups seek a world state. What

groups want is for Others to recognize them, not necessarily to recognize Others. Nor does it mean that groups are forever unchanging. Group identity is a process not a thing, and as such its boundaries can be reconstituted on a higher level. But just as the willingness of individuals to participate in a collective identity ultimately depends on their recognition as separate individuals, so too would groups entering into a larger collective identity want their "difference" recognized. Universalism, in short, depends on recognition of particularism.[62] World state formation is not only a cosmopolitan process, but a communitarian one as well.

The struggle for recognition, then, operates on two levels simultaneously, between individuals and between groups. If we add to this the fact that some inter-group struggles today are taking place within existing state boundaries (as in sub-state nationalism), and some inter-individual struggles are taking place on the global level (as in efforts to create a global human rights regime), at the micro-level we have a hugely complex picture, with many cross-cutting relationships. On the other hand, my argument is that these are all part of a single system-wide developmental logic. In order to highlight that logic in what follows, therefore, I shall make two simplifying assumptions: 1) struggles for recognition within current state boundaries, whether by individual or groups, can be bracketed; and 2) the units in struggles for recognition at the system level are initially states. The first does not imply that domestic struggles for recognition are over, that they are unimportant, or that they will not affect the process by which the global struggle for recognition unfolds. The point is only that because the system's *telos* is multiply realizable at the micro-level, the details of domestic struggles do not affect its eventual end-state. The second assumption is justified by the facts that the system has always consisted of autonomous

groups which limit inter-individual struggles across group boundaries, and those groups are today almost entirely states. Despite this state-centric starting point, however, as we shall see individual desires for recognition will emerge to play a crucial role in the system's development.

THE LOGIC OF ANARCHY

The struggle for recognition is the bottom-up aspect of my teleological argument. I now turn to its top-down aspect. I argue that the process of world state formation progresses through five "stages" of recognition, the first four of which form distinct cultures of anarchy (cf. Wendt, 1999). As cultures each embodies shared information that constitutes boundary conditions on the interactions of the system's parts, and as a progression of cultures they increasingly constrain those interactions, but in so doing enable growing subjectivity and freedom at the global level. What drives the system forward is the logic of anarchy, which through downward causation conditions struggles for recognition in two ways: by making it possible for them to be pursued through organized violence,[63] and by generating military technology that makes the costs of such violence less and less tolerable. Each culture of anarchy is a way of regulating global struggles for recognition so as to keep their costs manageable, and as such constitutes a local attractor in the development of the system. However, all attractors before the world state are ultimately unstable. New stages with more demanding boundary conditions emerge as partial solutions to instabilities in the stage before it,[64] but in turn bring about new instabilities that require further development for their resolution.

Thus, the process of world state formation involves a "reorganization" of structures of individual and group recognition, from a world in which they are mediated by state boundaries to

one in which they are not. Given that I have defined a world state in terms of the "thin" criterion of a global monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence, but that the proposed end-state for the system's development must satisfy a "thicker" criterion of mutual recognition of equality, what I am in effect arguing is that we will get a Weberian state by creating a Hegelian one.

What follows is a theoretical rather than historical argument, in two respects. First, it is based on a conceptual analysis of "problems" of recognition that must be solved for a world state to emerge, not on historical experience. The fact that few real anarchic systems correspond to these ideal types is not particularly relevant. Second, the proposed progression of stages does not preclude backsliding in a given historical moment. The argument is not linear; it claims only that any step backwards will eventually be balanced by two steps forward. With those qualifications in mind I take up each stage in turn.

Stage One: The System of States

This is the stage of complete non-recognition, what Hobbes called the "warre of all against all" and Bull (1977) a "system" of states. This system is constituted by three boundary conditions: the fact of multiple interacting states (individuals are not actors at all here), or simple "difference"; the absence of any mechanism to enforce cooperation among these states (anarchy), and a mutual belief that they are "enemies" (Wendt, 1999: 260-3), with no rights and thus social constraints on what they may do. Because there is no recognition there is no perceived collective identity in the system, and by implication states do not even have genuine subjectivity. Insofar as states share an awareness that they are in a Hobbesian system it will constitute a "culture," but this culture and its implicit collective identity will be "repressed" (ibid: 278).

The Hobbesian stage is unstable in the long run because it does not begin to meet needs for recognition. Taking the dyadic case first, we can see this instability and its developmental consequences by considering the two possible outcomes of a struggle for recognition in such a system. One, which we would expect if one state is significantly stronger than the other, is the conquest and thus elimination of the weaker state. The dyad will become a single unit, and the locus of self-organization will shift to the interaction of this enlarged state with other states.[65] If success begets success and conquests continue, then eventually there will be only one state left, and the system will no longer be anarchic. Such an outcome might come to be seen as legitimate by its subjects and thus be stable for some time. However, if the conqueror does not recognize its victims then they will eventually try to break away, thereby recreating an anarchic system. In other words, a Weberian world state that is not also a Hegelian one will be unstable in the long run. On the other hand, if the world conqueror does recognize its victims as full subjects, then a world state will be achieved without the intermediate stages of development.

The second possible outcome would occur if the two states are equal in power. In that case neither can conquer the other, and they will continue to struggle for recognition. This need not involve constant warfare, but will require constant preparations for war that drain societal resources, and war will remain a significant probability. This dynamic too is not stable. Either one side will eventually get the upper hand and conquer the other, or they will "wear each other out" (Burbidge, 1994: 157) to the point that they realize that continued struggle is pointless, and agree to mutual recognition. The effect of anarchy on military technology is crucial here, since over time it will increase the cost of war, and with it growing negative feedback on a policy of

non-recognition. Conversely, mutual recognition would create positive feedback, since it would allow competitors to devote more resources to recognition struggles with third parties, enhancing the likelihood of success there. This may be seen as a stylized account of the process that led to the Peace of Westphalia, and one might expect a similar outcome in, for example, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict today.

Whichever outcome transpires, therefore, a Hobbesian anarchy is unstable in the long run, and will eventually move toward a non-Hobbesian attractor. In principle that could be any of the remaining developmental stages below, including a world state. However, so that I can detail the entire logic let's assume that the system can only solve one developmental problem at a time.

Stage Two: The Society of States.

The instabilities of the Hobbesian culture can be resolved by moving to a system in which states recognize each other's subjectivity, but not that of each other's citizens. This is Hedley Bull's (1977) "society of states," or a "Lockean" culture of anarchy. Two boundary conditions remain the same as in the Hobbesian culture – alterity and anarchy – but instead of the third, enmity, states now constitute each other as "rivals" (Wendt, 1999: 279-83). Rivals recognize each other's sovereignty as independent subjects. Taking away the right to conquer each other constrains their freedom to some extent, but makes possible a measure of positive freedom and subjectivity that does not exist in the Hobbesian world. There is also the emergence of some collective identity among states – they see themselves as a "We" bound by certain rules – that constrains their interactions in accordance with the culture's norms. On the other hand, the depth of this collective identity remains shallow, and in particular, limited war remains

acceptable. War may not be used to conquer other states, but is still legitimate for purposes of territorial or other gain – what John Ruggie (1998: 162-3) calls "positional" as opposed to "constitutive" wars. This generates two sources of instability.

First, even though positional wars do not threaten states' "lives," they can still be costly, and these costs will tend to rise over time with secular improvements in military technology due to anarchy. Today, even conventional wars between equal states can be enormously destructive, and will be only more so in the future, a fact which may help explain their contemporary rarity.

Second, even if states don't get "killed" in positional wars, people do. As such, as in the Hobbesian culture, here too individuals are not recognized as subjects outside their own state, and thus as subjects in the world system. Individuals do not like dying in war, especially when their group identity is already recognized by other states. Given the importance of group identity to individuals, sacrifice in war makes sense in a Hobbesian culture, since people are fighting for individual recognition as well. But in a Lockean culture states have secured limited recognition, and so it is less clear how sacrifice for the state would meet individuals' needs. Over time we can expect individuals to make those needs apparent to their leaders, inducing the latter toward growing caution in the use of force as a tool of diplomacy, particularly as the costs of war rise. Eventually, through this pressure from below states in a Lockean culture will learn to desist from war altogether, and to find non-violent means to solve foreign policy problems (at least among states that are similarly reluctant to go to war). This goes back to the central purpose of the state, which is not only to express but also to secure the recognition of its members: states cannot fully fulfill this function as long as they are willing to send their people to war. In short,

what we see here is the emergence of individuals' struggle for recognition alongside that of states as a force at the system level. The possibility of war means that individual recognition must be external as well as internal, which requires breaking down its mediation by state boundaries.

This narrative of instability is similar to the logic of the "democratic peace," in which the reluctance of individuals to die for their country in the absence of existential threats helps pacify relations among democratic states. However, it is not clear that my story depends on democracy at the unit-level. Such states may be sufficient for translating individuals' desires for recognition into inter-state peace, but we do not know whether they are necessary.[66] Since what matters to my argument is only that individuals' desire for recognition be somehow realized, it seems wise at this point to leave open exactly how this would be accomplished at the domestic level.

If a Lockean culture is not a stable end-state, then in what direction will the system go? One possibility is to descend back to a Hobbesian culture, as we saw in World War II. But even if the Axis had conquered the world, this would have merely set the stage for subsequent forward movement. Either the conquered peoples would have revolted, dismembering the Axis empire and restoring the logic of anarchy, or the Axis would have recognized them, constituting a world state. So even if the system backslides temporarily from its developmental path, the instabilities of the Hobbesian culture mean that eventually it must come back to the Lockean culture and its primary source of instability – war – which can only be resolved by moving forward.

Stage Three: World Society

The problem of war is solved by developing a universal security community, in which disputes are settled non-violently. This begins to extend global recognition from states to

individuals, constituting a further boundary condition on the system's operation. In that respect this stage is comparable to the kind of recognition that Hegel argues is present in civil society, and so it might be called cosmopolitan or world society as opposed to a society of states. The system has now constrained the liberty of its parts even more (they are no longer free to make war), but in so doing expanded positive freedom, now for both individuals and states.

Yet, this developmental stage too is not a stable end-state, because of the absence of collective protection against aggression. Even if everyone today is committed to peaceful dispute resolution, there is always the possibility in the future of rogue states emerging through domestic revolution, which reject non-violence and attack other members of the system (cf. Mearsheimer, 2001). In principle there are two ways to deal with this problem, neither of which is available in this culture. One is by centralized coercion. That is unavailable because in a world society states retain sovereignty. The other is decentralized enforcement by a collective security system. That may be unavailable as well, because by itself a security community is compatible with states being indifferent to each other's fate; it imposes no requirement of mutual aid. A state threatened by a rogue could therefore not be certain that others would help defend it against aggression. To sustain a world society, therefore, actors need a more demanding form of recognition, one that imposes not only negative duties (non-violence) but also positive ones (mutual aid).

Where does the system go from here? As always, there is always the possibility of degeneration back to Stage Two or even One, but as we saw above those outcomes are not stable in the long run either, and so will only bring us back to Stage Three again. Conversely, there are good positive reasons to move forward toward a commitment of mutual aid. Consider a system

of three states, A, B, and C. If A and B have a security community they will both experience significant positive feedback: no fear of war, at least on one flank; a reduced need for arms; and recognition of both group and individual subjectivities. A and B will be reluctant to give these benefits up, and as such once peace has been achieved, they will have an interest in its being perpetual. Now let C become an existential threat to B (only). This would create the possibility for A that a previously peaceful border would be occupied by a hostile state, plunging the border back to a state of war. That gives A an interest in defending B, even though A is not directly threatened.[67] In effect, the anticipated negative feedback of its neighbor's demise sustains the positive feedback provided by their peaceful relationship. Since these incentives are mutual, both have reason to care about each other's fate, and form a permanent alliance. This does not mean that states will always recognize these benefits, but those that do "think like a team" will have a better chance of survival than those that do not, suggesting that in the long run they will colonize the system (Cusack and Stoll, 1994; Cederman, 2001).[68] Once the system reaches the stage of world society, therefore, the desire to reproduce it will induce it to develop even farther.

Stage Four: Collective Security

At this stage the system acquires an additional boundary condition: not only must its members – now both individuals and states – recognize each other's right to exist and practice non-violent dispute resolution, but they must defend each other against threats on the principle of "all for one, one for all." The system has now reached a "Kantian culture" of collective security or "friendship" (Wendt, 1999: 298-9). Actors have a well-developed sense of collective identity with respect to security, such that each sustains its difference by identifying with the

fate of the whole. Although today we are far having from such an identity on a global scale, its benefits have already been demonstrated at the regional level. The ease with which the U.S. was able to put together coalitions to fight the Gulf War and today's War on Terrorism, the persistence of NATO after the end of the Cold War, and even the Concert of Europe (Schroeder, 1993; Mitzen, 2001) are all best explained by perceived common fate. In all these cases mutual recognition had positive rather than just negative behavioral implications.

Note that a universal collective security system would not be a world state. Territorial states retain their sovereignty, and as such its functioning depends on their consent. A collective security system could not require its elements to continue recognizing each other, in the sense of commanding a legitimate monopoly of force to enforce it. The whole structure is voluntary in a way that a state is not. Strictly speaking, it remains anarchic. On the other hand, given that collective security seems to meet both individual and group needs for recognition, it is not immediately clear why anything more is needed. What is the cause of instability that propels the system forward to yet another attractor? This is the most difficult step in the argument.

The difficulty is felt by Kant, whose teleology stops at the pacific federation, and if Fukuyama is representative this is also where contemporary Liberals end up. In fact Kant shows more ambivalence on this score than is sometimes thought. In "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose," he seems to endorse giving the federation enforcement powers that would significantly qualify the sovereignty of its members. However, later in "Perpetual Peace" he comes down more clearly on the side of a purely consensual system, with no coercive power at the supranational level (although suggesting that this is a "second-best" outcome).[69] Kant's

skepticism about a world state is threefold: it is not feasible to organize and enforce political authority on a global scale; states will not give up their sovereignty to a world state in any case; and a world state would be despotic. Drawing on Deudney, I have already addressed the first concern: dramatic technological changes since the 18th century have made it possible today to project coercive power on a planetary scale. But the other concerns remain, seeming to indicate that the development of the system would stop with universal collective security.

An argument for the inevitability of one more stage must begin with the instability of collective security as a solution to the struggle for recognition. Perhaps the most commonly adduced instability, usually emphasized by Realists, is that collective action problems make collective security inadequate as a deterrent to aggression; when it is most needed it is most likely to fail. While this problem has some force, it points not toward a world state but to the degeneration of anarchy back at least to a Lockean culture, if not to the war of all against all. Moreover, the Realist argument presupposes that states remain self-interested egoists, which is undercut by the kind of collective identity formation that would accompany the development of a collective security system. However, two other sources of instability are not so easily handled.

First, because collective security is a consensus-based system in which states retain their sovereignty, it would have no right to prevent a state from "seceding" and then arming itself for aggressive purposes (Carson, 1988: 179-80). Kant tried to deal with this problem by calling for voluntary disarmament, but even if that were successful it does not solve the problem of possible re-armament in the future.[70] Second, and more importantly, collective security does not fully secure individual and group desires for recognition. For what, in the end, is the retention of

sovereignty if not retention of the right to decide, unilaterally, to revoke someone's recognized status and if necessary kill them? A state might promise not to exercise this right, and even keep that promise for a long time. But as long as the right to kill is not permanently surrendered to an authority with the capability to enforce recognition, the Other will remain vulnerable to a change of policy by the Self. These problems suggest that a collective security system would not be a stable end-state. But we still need an argument for why this would lead to a world state rather than back to more primitive forms of anarchy. Three considerations suggest themselves.

One is the memory of what anarchy was like before collective security. Just as the memory of World Wars I and II has been an important source of European integration (Waever, 1995), so too could it be a source of universal integration, especially when reinforced by the rising costs of war due to technological change. Much like Hobbes' retrospective argument for the state, this memory would serve as a constraint on the system's degeneration, making a move back toward anarchy less attractive than a move forward to a world state.

A second is that if states have enough collective identity to defend each other even when they are not themselves threatened, then *de facto* they do recognize obligations to each other and their citizens, and the *de jure* issue is moot. The only reason not to make recognition binding – to "constitutionalize" it – is to leave open the possibility of changing their minds, but that seems hard to square with a genuine commitment to universal recognition. Here Hegel's argument that recognition that is not reciprocated is ultimately "unsatisfying" may come into play. The kinds of actors most likely to be vulnerable to such self-dissatisfaction are precisely those found at this stage of the system's development: ones whose self-conception is that of civilized, law-abiding

actors who believe that all individuals and groups should be recognized. Such actors would be particularly susceptible to the "civilizing force of hypocrisy" (Elster, 1995), and as such find it hard in the long run to justify to themselves not constitutionalizing their recognition of outsiders.

However, while removing constraints on world state formation, these first two considerations are still in a sense negative, since they amount to reasons not to resist the attraction of a world state, not to embrace it. A third factor is therefore crucial: the struggle for recognition itself. Recognition that is not enforceable by a common power is in the end not really recognition at all, since it depends on the goodwill and choice of the recognizer. Genuine recognition means that the recognized has a right to recognition, and the Self therefore has a duty to the Other. Genuine recognition is about obligation, not charity. Only when acting on behalf of the Other has become an enforceable obligation is recognition secure.

This point becomes particularly salient for the Great Powers, who are arguably the greatest hurdle to world state formation. The struggle of individuals and Small Powers for enforceable recognition is not particularly puzzling, since their weakness makes them vulnerable to the strong. They have little to lose from making mutual recognition of equality accountable to a world state. But the Great Powers are in a different position: they are not as vulnerable as other actors, they can enjoy unprecedented wealth as a result of their sovereign right to restrict immigration, and they have the ability to treat other states as they see fit. In effect, by virtue of their "go it alone power" (Gruber, 2000) they already have the material benefits of recognition without the costs. The current resistance of the U.S. to binding multilateral commitments is symptomatic of the problem. What could Great Powers gain by joining a world state?

It is a good question, but consider what would happen in the long run if Great Powers insist on retaining their sovereignty. For the reasons identified above, a non-binding collective security system is not a stable end-state. As such, we can expect individuals and Small Powers to continue pressing for recognition, and as their violence potential grows through the diffusion of ever more destructive weapons they will be able increasingly to threaten the Great Powers (in the contemporary context think North Korea here, or al-Qaeda). Small and Middle Powers will also have incentives to amalgamate, creating new Great Powers that can "balance" existing ones, and perhaps setting in motion arms races. In such conditions the ability of Great Powers to insulate themselves from global struggles for recognition will erode, as will the legitimacy of unilateral action, making it more and more difficult to sustain a system in which their power and privileges are not tied to an enforceable rule of law. It may take some time for Great Powers – and perhaps especially "hyper-powers" like the United States – to see the light. But if the choice is between a world of growing threats as a result of refusing to fully recognize Others versus a world in which Others are not threatening because their desires for recognition are satisfied, it seems clear which decision rational Great Powers should make.

Stage Five: The World State

This brings us to the final stage in the system's development, the world state. With the transfer of state sovereignty to the global level the recognition of individuals will no longer be mediated by state boundaries, even though as recognized subjects themselves, states retain some individuality (particularism within universalism). Individuals and states alike will have lost the negative freedom to engage in unilateral violence, but gained the positive freedom of fully

recognized subjectivity. The system will have become an "individual" (Buss, 1987).

The question remains, however, whether a world state would be a stable end-state, or be itself subject to instabilities that ultimately undo it. In other words, even if we assume that the logic of anarchy is teleological, how do we know that it involves a fixed-point attractor rather than, for example, a periodic attractor that would induce cycles of anarchy and world states?

A partial answer is that a world state would have the capability to prevent secession, giving it a stronger homeostatic logic than any culture of anarchy. However, coercion alone does not seem enough, since individuals and groups will continue to evolve, and might at some point decide that what satisfied their desires for recognition in the past no longer does so. Efforts to crush such desires by force certainly have not prevented some existing states from breaking up.

In thinking about whether the logic of anarchy has a fixed-point as opposed to another kind of attractor, it is important to emphasize that the former does not imply that a world state would necessarily persist without interruption. Even though a fixed-point attractor constitutes a self-enforcing equilibrium, equilibria are always vulnerable to exogenous shocks. Since a world state would remain an at least partially open system, as a matter of historical contingency despite its strong homeostatic logic it could temporarily fall apart. Instead, the attractor question here is whether there is something in the dynamics of the system itself that would necessarily induce an eventual collapse, sending it along another developmental path. Addressing this question gives us an opportunity to consider three objections to my argument, each of which highlights a potential endogenous source of instability in a world state.[71]

The first is Kant's worry about despotism. Could a world state be despotic? If a world

state met only the "thin" Weberian criterion of a legitimate monopoly of force, then in principle it could be despotic. But in that case by my argument it would not be a stable end-state, since it would not satisfy the "thicker" Hegelian criterion of mutual recognition of equality. In such a state the struggle for recognition would go on. Since my argument is that we will get a Weberian world state by creating a Hegelian one, the real question is whether the latter could be despotic, which seems unlikely. The most obvious threat here is a "democratic deficit" (e.g. Wolf, 1999). The sheer scale of a world state and the corresponding dilution of voice for its members would create a huge distance between them and the state (Dahl, 1994). Although today's worries about the democratic deficit stem primarily from the absence of virtually any formal means by which transnational power structures can be held accountable, they are already a source of resistance to political integration and might intensify as the latter deepens.

On the other hand, large democracies today already face this problem, and are not for that reason considered inherently unstable. Modern communications technology and institutional compromises like representative democracy and subsidiarity can mitigate democratic worries to a substantial degree. But the real lesson of modern states is that democracy is not the only basis of political legitimacy. The enforcement of mutual recognition of equality, economic well-being, and efficiency may be equally important, and could be even more so in a world state. Moreover, consider the alternative to a world state, an anarchic world in which territorial states retain their sovereignty over violence. It is of the essence of sovereignty that state power can be exercised against non-members without unaccountability. Is not <u>that</u> "despotism"? Whether justified or not, to whom is the United States accountable for its recent killing of thousands of civilians in

Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq? Whatever the accountability problems of a world state might be, they seem like a more satisfactory solution to the recognition problem than anarchy.

A second potential threat is nationalism, which in the last century has substantially increased the number of states in the system through decolonization, thus at least temporarily reversing the historical pattern of global political consolidation to which Carneiro (1978) points. However, the rise of nationalism can actually be seen as evidence for my argument, because it is about the struggle for recognition. In 1945 a majority of the world's population lived in empires ("despotisms") that to varying degrees did not recognize them as full subjects. As a result they struggled for recognition, and eventually secured their freedom. In that sense nationalism and decolonization have made it possible for previously unrecognized actors to participate freely in the system, and even contemplate binding themselves to a supranational authority. Any such constraints they accept will be consensual and correspondingly stable. Nationalist struggles for recognition are by no means over, and more new states – "more anarchy" – may yet be created. But while further fragmentation is in one sense a step back, it is also a precondition for moving forward, since it is only when difference is recognized that a larger identity can be stable. "The greater the diversity between individuals or particulars, the higher the identity or universal in which the differences meet."[72] Far from suppressing nationalism, a world state will only be possible if it embraces it.

A last potential source of instability in a world state involves what might seem like a contradiction at the heart of my analysis. On the one hand, like today's states I am arguing that a world state would have subjectivity – it would be a corporate person or Self. On the other hand,

my explanation for the inevitability of a world state assumes that a stable Self depends on mutual recognition of equality with an Other. By assimilating all subjects into one collective identity, a world state would seem to lack such an Other and thus be unstable. Bracketing the possibility of an extra-terrestrial Other (cf. Harrison, 1997), how is this global Self to sustain its subjectivity? Who, in short, recognizes the world state?

Recognition presupposes an axis of differentiation between potential subjects. This suggests a two-part answer to the question. First, the world state would be recognized by the individuals and groups that constitute its parts, and it in turn would constitute and recognize them. This is possible because even though parts and whole here are mutually constitutive, they are not identical; there is a boundary or difference between them. The members of a world state have their own subjectivities that constrain its behavior, and the world state has a subjectivity that constrains their behavior. This internal differentiation allows each to recognize the Other, while incorporating that Other within its own definition of Self. Such a process goes on every day within today's territorial states. On the other hand, this comparison also highlights an important difference between the two cases, which is that in territorial states the struggle for recognition assumes a spatial boundary between members and non-members. Insiders form their sense of Self not only in relation to each other, but through practices that differentiate them from outside Others. Since a world state would be global, it would not have such an external Other available to it, which might be thought to undermine the stability of its subjectivity.

That leads to the second part of the answer: a world state could compensate for the absence of spatial differentiation by creating a temporal differentiation between its present and

its past (cf. Ruggie, 1993; Waever, 1995). The past here is anarchy, with all its unpleasantness. In Hegelian terms we could say that "history" becomes the Other in terms of which the global Self is defined. Of course, this Other does not have a subjectivity of its own, and so cannot literally recognize the world state. But a functional equivalent to recognition can be achieved by an act of temporal self-differentiation. Whether at the individual or collective level, identities are always constituted by narratives (Ringmar, 1996), in which a present identity is legitimated in relation to a past (and often a future as well). Sometimes, as in many nationalist narratives, this process interprets the present Self as identical to an imagined past Self. Other times, however, collective narratives draw a distinction between past and present identities. Germany today, for example, constitutes its identity in part by its difference from the Nazi state. Temporal self-differentiation makes mutual constitution possible, thereby enabling "an Other" to stabilize the global Self.

That stability raises a final question: what happens after the world state is reached? Do "politics" and "history" come to an end? If by 'politics' and 'history' we mean what they do in anarchy, namely struggles for recognition mediated by war, then yes, in one sense they would be over. I say "in one sense" because a world state would still need to reproduce itself and thus be forever in process. And since even a world state would not be a perfectly closed system it would always be vulnerable to temporary disruptions, like secessionism. However, a world state would differ from anarchy in that it would constitute such disruptions as crime, not as politics or history. The possibility of crime may always be with us, but for reasons given above it does not constitute a stable alternative to a world state. Moreover, politics or history in a different, "non-

anarchic" sense would clearly not be over. A world state would not be a utopia in which there was nothing left to struggle over. Think of what goes on inside states today. They are full of problems – crime, poverty, pollution – all of which are the stuff of politics. Indeed, even the struggle for recognition, in the thick sense, would continue. There are always new ways to constitute thick recognition, and in that sense the struggle for it is part of the human condition (Honneth, 1996: 126-7; Bauman, 2001). But once a world state has emerged those struggles will be domesticated by enforceable law, and so for purposes of state formation no longer important. Rather than a complete end of history, therefore, it might be better to say that a world state would be the end of just one kind of history. Even if one *telos* is over, another would be beginning.

CONCLUSION

Against the perpetual war of Realism and the contingent perpetual peace of modern Liberalism, I have argued that a world state is inevitable. Its cause is the teleological logic of anarchy, which channels struggles for recognition toward an end-state that transcends that logic. As such, the argument reverses social scientists' traditional "rearview mirror" perspective on time and causation (Wendt, 2001), since it suggests that "the ultimate organizing principle [of the system] is in the outcome of the process and not its genetic origin."[73] One might even say, then, that the logic at work here is that of recognition, not of anarchy.

It is natural at this point to ask whether a Hegelian world state would be desirable. Although this question is not directly relevant to my argument and cannot be dealt with adequately here (see Griffin, 2003), on my view the answer is yes. Other things being equal, it

seems difficult to argue that a world in which recognition is unequal and the right to engage in organized violence is privatized would be normatively superior to one in which recognition is equal and violence is collectivized. That does not mean that a world state would satisfy all demands of justice, but it would be at least a minimum condition for a just world order.

I have argued that a world state will emerge whether or not actors intend to bring it about. Since this might be criticized for implying that there is no role for agency in world politics, by way of conclusion I want to show that this is not the case, at either the micro or macro-level.

At the micro-level agency matters just as much here it does in non-teleological theories. Struggles for recognition are intentional, and there is nothing in the logic of anarchy that forces them to go in one direction or another at any given moment. Anarchy is (still) what states (and other actors) make of it, and so they are still ethically and politically responsible for the quality of life in world politics. Moreover, in addition to the intentionality of actors struggling for their own recognition, there is also the possibility for a more globally-oriented intentionality in the form of actors who believe in the inevitability of a world state, and try to speed it up. To be sure, this kind of agency is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, belief in the inevitability of a world state would give actors reasons to intentionally redefine their interests in terms consistent with it, thereby facilitating the process. On the other hand, such a belief could also be used to justify trying to force history along, and even for war against those who refuse to see the light. Some of the worst historical excesses of human agency – Nazism, Bolshevism, and so on – have been based on just such a teleological faith. But if anything that seems to provide more reason for ethical and political vigilance on the micro-level, not less.

Moreover, my argument has an interesting policy implication for grand strategy. Grand strategies should be based on a correct theory of where the world system is going. If Realists are right that anarchy is "programmed" for war, then it makes sense to define one's sovereignty and interests in egoistic terms and act on that basis. International law is irrelevant or an impediment to the national interest, and one should pursue a unilateralist policy whenever possible. On the other hand, if "Idealists" are right about the system's end-state, and – importantly – that it is not so far off as to be meaningless for policy, then a different grand strategy emerges. Rather than go down with the ship of national sovereignty, states should try to "get the best deal" they can in the emerging global constitution. That requires multilateral participation in the process of world state formation, not fighting it unilaterally. Ironically, if Idealists are right, such states will do better for themselves in the long run than those that take a Realist view. If a world state is inevitable, better to "get with the program" than wait around on the sidelines till it gets to you.

Finally, there is an intriguing but more controversial possibility for agency at the macro-level, in the form of the world system being an agent in its own development. I have not argued that here, limiting my treatment of the macro-level process to its non-intentional aspect. On the other hand, however, like states today, a world state would be a subject. Such a subject could not intend its own creation (that would be backward causation), but it seems counter-intuitive to say that prior to its emergence there would be no intentionality at the system level, until it suddenly appears in a world state. Instead, it is more plausible to suggest that the process of world state formation involves a progressive "amplification" of intentionality from individuals and groups to the global level (cf. Gabora, 2002). Early on the degree of global intentionality is quite low, but

as the system matures it acquires more and more attributes of subjectivity. This invites a reading of world state formation as the system becoming conscious of itself, and so increasingly able to participate as an agent in its own development. While necessarily imposing boundaries on the agency of its members, it only in this way that they can fully realize their own subjectivity.

ENDNOTES

[1] For a good overview see especially Kauffmann (1995), and Weber and Depew (1996) on its relationship to neo-Darwinism. By virtue of its inter-disciplinary character self-organization thinking has taken a variety of specific forms: the theory of autopoiesis, dynamical systems theory, complexity theory, agent-based modeling, and others.
[2] See Axelrod (1997), Cederman (1997; 2001), Fearon (1996), and Jervis (1997). It should be noted, however, that the cybernetic and general systems traditions of IR theory in the 1950s and 60s have important similarities to recent self-organization theory; see Alker (1996: 93, note 28).
[3] See Kahler (1999), Thayer (2000), and Thompson, ed. (2001). Also noteworthy here is Modelski's (1990) synthetic evolutionary approach to world politics, which builds on a reading of Kant as an early self-organization theorist, but stops short of defending his teleological view of history.
[4] For an inter-disciplinary sampling, see Luhmann (1995), Epstein and Axtell (1996), Vallacher and Nowak (1997), Witt (1997), Marion (1999), and Macy and Willer (2002).
[5] See, for example, Salthe (1993), Christensen (1996), Ulanowicz (1997), Swenson (1997), Marion (1999), Juarrero (1999), Albrecht (2000), and McLaughlin (2001).
[6] Although their understandings of teleology were notably different. Kant believed that purposiveness was not an objective feature of nature and thus teleological explanations were of heuristic value only, whereas Hegel took the stronger, more ontological view that nature itself was teleological. (On this particular question the position I take below is "Hegelian"). On the differences between the two on this score see deVries (1991) and Dahlstrom (1998), and for discussion of the possible incoherence of Kant's view see Kleingeld (1999) and Guyer (2000).
[7] See Vincent (1983: 202), Nicholson (1990: 225, here referring to the neo-Hegelian Bernard Bosanquet), and Peperzak (1994).
[8] I use 'positivist' here to refer to both empiricist and scientific realist approaches to science, which otherwise differ on a number of issues (Wendt, 1999: chapter 2).
[9] This assumes that one does not share Kant's view that teleological explanations are of "heuristic" value only.
[10] Though see Alker (1996: 64-103).
[11] I claim no fidelity here to the understandings of teleology offered by Aristotle, Kant, or Hegel, which were in themselves quite different. What follows is an attempt to reconstruct a coherent logic of teleological explanation from the literature on self-organizing systems, nothing more.
[12] This form is also common in functional explanations, and some of today's debate about teleological explanation is motivated by a renewed interest in functionalism, although the two are not identical (Wright, 1976; McLaughlin, 2001).
[13] Machamer (1977) and Cohen (1982: 48; here referring specifically to "consequence explanations").
[14] E.g. von Wright (1971), Hutto (1999), Sehon (2000); in IR see Kratochwil (1989) and Smith (2000).
[15] The ultimate issue here – the nature of "mental causation" – is rooted in the mind-body problem, which has so far defied solution in mechanistic terms (Chalmers, 1996). The case for a teleological reading of intentional explanation turns on that failure.
[16] For further discussion see Wendt (2003).
[17] See Asma (1996), Allen, et al., eds. (1998) and Short (2002).
[18] These two approaches go back to classic treatments of functionalism by Hempel and Nagel respectively; see McLaughlin (2001).
[19] On Aristotle's conceptualization of final causation see Gotthelf (1987).
[20] Both involve material causality, which I shall leave implicit in the following discussion.
[21] Examples from IR scholarship include the logic of domino theory and the spiral model (Jervis, 1997: 165-75).
[22] On the role of closure in self-organizing systems see Chandler and Van de Vijver, eds. (2000).
[23] Bechtel (1986), Boylan (1986), Salthe (1993), and Sawyer (2001a).
[24] For varying treatments of downward causation see Campbell (1974), Juarrero (1999), Emmeche, et al., eds. (2000), Meyerling (2000), Sawyer (2001b), and Hodgson (2002).
[25] Boylan (1986: 22); also see Bechtel (1986: 36), Juarrero (1999: 126), and Hodgson (2001: 359).
[26] Pape (1993: 590), Hulswit (1996: 185-6), and Enc and Adams (1998: 388). On multiple realizability see Wendt (1999: 152-6) and the references therein.
[27] Words like 'monitor' and 'intervene' might sound like they presuppose intentionality, but they need not be read that way. The human body, for example, constantly monitors its sub-systems and intervenes against pathogens, all without any intentionality.
[28] Mayr (1982), Short (1983: 319), Jackson and Pettit (1993), Hulswit (1996), and Meyerling (2000: 189).

[29] Whether Waltz's conceptualization of anarchy is up to the task of this argument is another matter. Arguably it is not anarchy per se that is doing the causal work, but a certain culture of anarchy (Wendt, 1999: chapter 6).
[30] On the general point here see Byerly (1979: ##) and Enc and Adams (1998: 386).
[31] As is the case in Kant and Hegel's theories of world system development. Although they do not make the link to teleology, for a good discussion of the importance of the interaction between bottom-up and top-down processes in Kant's theory see Huntley (1996) and Harrison (2002).
[32] For a good summary see Vallacher and Nowak (1997: 82-84); also see Juarrero (1999: 152-55).
[33] Hodgson (2001: 350). Various verbs are used in the literature to describe this end-directed effect, such as "activation," "entraining," "harnessing," "orchestration," and so on; see Byerly (1979: 172), de Vries (1991: 62), Enc and Adams (1998: 390-1), Juarrero (1999), and Meyerling (2000: 196).
[34] This objection provides an occasion to consider the claim, reflected in the title of this article, that teleological systems "inevitably" complete their development. Literally of course this is not true. Organisms may be killed or die from disease before they reach maturity, and in international politics one can imagine various exogenous shocks that could prevent world state formation: an asteroid impact, plague, ecological collapse, and so on. The theoretical point here is that all real world systems are open systems and as such vulnerable to disruption. On the other hand, a constitutive feature of any teleological system is that it restricts the flow of energy across its boundaries, making it semi-closed and enabling it within limits to determine for itself which stimuli it will respond to (Juarrero, 1999: 143). Sometimes shocks will nevertheless overwhelm a system's boundaries and it will collapse, but absent such shocks a normal teleological system will indeed "inevitably" finish its development. Strictly speaking, therefore, my claim is that a world state is inevitable *ceteris paribus*, but hopefully it is no less interesting for that.
[35] Juarrero (1999: 143, passim) is quite good on this point.
[36] On the ontological status of unobservable entities in science see Wendt (1999: chapter 2).
[37] Chase-Dunn (1990) also sees Carneiro's estimate as pointing toward a world state.
[38] The fact that inter-group struggles within states involve non-state groups is not jeopardized by this assumption, since given the dominance of the state form at the system level these groups either want states of their own or will resolve their conflicts within state boundaries.
[39] For more extensive discussion than I can offer here see Wendt (1999: chapter 5).
[40] On thinking like a team see Sugden (1993). Note that the state "team" might not have a single head, as in a federal or democratic system.
[41] For further discussion see Wendt (1999; 2003).
[42] As such, collective identity is not an aggregation of preexisting individual identities, but constitutive of those identities in the first place.
[43] These parallel the three kinds of contracts that Fichte argued constitute the state as an organism, on which Hegel later drew (Williams, 1997: 296-7).
[44] Indeed, as a concrete reality as opposed to an ideal type it is demanding political form even at the territorial level, where many modern "states" fail to fulfill all of its criteria. That is not a threat to my argument, however, since the latter does not depend on all units in the system being states in the first place, let alone de facto Weberian ones. If my theory is correct, the failure of some territorial states to satisfy the Weberian ideal simply means that the process of world state formation has that much farther to go.
[45] Varela (1997) and Juarrero (1999) are particularly good on the simultaneously processual and homeostatic qualities of self-organizing systems.
[46] Fukuyama (1992) emphasizes another material aspect to the struggle for recognition, economics. His argument complements and reinforces mine, but since I am interested here only in the logic of anarchy I shall bracket it below.
[47] Realists have argued that a world state was <u>necessary</u> for world peace (see Speer, 1968 on Morgenthau), but not that it is inevitable.
[48] Deudney (2000: 18-20) also points to E.H. Carr as a forerunner of his argument.
[49] The fact that nuclear missiles are possessed by relatively few states limits the force of this argument today, but with the inevitable spread of and other weapons of mass destruction it will become increasingly powerful.
[50] For arguments that Kant's perpetual peace is an unstable equilibrium see Carson (1988) and Guyer (2000: 417).
[51] Wealth is sometimes also seen as a fundamental drive, but seems secondary insofar as one cannot enjoy wealth if one is dead.
[52] In the latter case difference is a social construction, but it may nevertheless present itself as a "brute fact" to those who are excluded from the group.
[53] These correspond roughly to Honneth's (1996) categories of legal and social esteem recognition.
[54] Although he would have understood monopolies of legitimate force that did not satisfy this requirement also as

"states," just not fully formed ones. Note too that even the Hegelian state might not be a liberal one (cf. Fukuyama, 1992); its essence seems closer to what John Rawls (1999) calls "decent" states.
[55] For further discussion of this suggestion see Fukuyama (1992).
[56] Hence his emphasis on the importance of inculcating loyalty through socialization.
[57] Williams (1997: 63), Ringmar (2002: 120-1); also see Fukuyama (1992: 193).
[58] Williams (1997: 57); Pippin (2000: 163); also see Baynes (2002).
[59] To which we might also add a desire for "ontological" or identity security; see Mitzen (2003).
[60] Given that it makes security the highest end, therefore, we might say that Neorealism is a slave morality.
[61] On supervenience see Wendt (1999: 155-6).
[62] See Linklater (1998), Taylor (1998), and Zerilli (1998).
[63] As Waltz (1959: 232) puts it, "wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them."
[64] This may be seen as a process of "epigenesis"; see Etzioni (1963).
[65] Historically, much of the consolidation of political authority globally took place in this way; see Kaufman (1997).
[66] It might be enough, for example, that states be "decent" in Rawls' (1999) sense.
[67] Cederman (2001) highlights the importance of territorial congruity in securing zones of peace.
[68] This is an example of "group selection" at work; see D. Wilson (1997).
[69] Kant (1991a; b); see Hurrell (1990: 190-4) for a good discussion of Kant's ambivalence.
[70] Both of these problems might be seen as manifestations of the "uncertainty about future intentions" problem emphasized by offensive Realists (Mearsheimer, 2001).
[71] A fourth potential source of instability is distributional conflict over resources and wealth. For a critique of the politics of recognition from this perspective see Fraser (2000), and Bauman (2001) for one line of response. This issue deserves a much more sustained treatment than I can give it here. Suffice it to say that, while distributional conflict may significantly complicate and delay the process of world state formation, in my view it provides no compelling rationale for the permanent maintenance of territorial state sovereignty.
[72] Nicholson (1990:209), here discussing Bosanquet.
[73] Tollaksen (1996: 563), partially quoting David Bohm.

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