Beate Jahn on the State of Nature, Liberalism’s
Other, and Classical Theory in International Relations
Other, and Classical Theory in International Relations
International Relations Theory is profoundly
entangled with the thought of classical theorists such as Hobbes, Locke, and
Rousseau. Their concepts and ideas serve as the universal foundations upon which
the edifices of our discipline are built. Yet rarely are the core concepts we
borrow from them problematized as cultural constructs that in and by themselves
served to legitimate violence and domination. Beate Jahn has dedicated herself
to unearthing some of contemporary IR’s classical underpinnings, linking
contemporary intervention to classical constructions of self and other through
philosophy. In this Talk, Jahn—among others—elaborates
on the cultural construction of the state of nature; relates it to the identity
processes at work in liberalism; and explains the importance of classical
theory in International Relations.
entangled with the thought of classical theorists such as Hobbes, Locke, and
Rousseau. Their concepts and ideas serve as the universal foundations upon which
the edifices of our discipline are built. Yet rarely are the core concepts we
borrow from them problematized as cultural constructs that in and by themselves
served to legitimate violence and domination. Beate Jahn has dedicated herself
to unearthing some of contemporary IR’s classical underpinnings, linking
contemporary intervention to classical constructions of self and other through
philosophy. In this Talk, Jahn—among others—elaborates
on the cultural construction of the state of nature; relates it to the identity
processes at work in liberalism; and explains the importance of classical
theory in International Relations.
What is, according to you, the central challenge
or principal debate in International Relations? And what is your position
regarding this challenge/in this debate?
or principal debate in International Relations? And what is your position
regarding this challenge/in this debate?
Well,
recent debates on the end of theory suggest that there is no clear candidate
for this at the moment. But I think that the central challenge to understanding
contemporary international politics is the fragmentation of the subject matter
of IR. By that I don’t mean the fact that there are a plurality of approaches—that
is, in principle, a good thing. But what I’ve noticed in my own work is that
we’re cutting up the subject matter, and that seems to me to be seriously
damaging to our understanding of international politics in general. We all know
that politics has something to do with economics and that economics has
something to do with norms and that norms have something do with politics—you
can’t properly explain either of those on its own. And yet, the approaches that
we have very often do focus on just one of these aspects of international
politics. And they say—no doubt about it—very interesting and insightful things
about them, but I’m not sure that this really tells us more about how
international politics in general works.
recent debates on the end of theory suggest that there is no clear candidate
for this at the moment. But I think that the central challenge to understanding
contemporary international politics is the fragmentation of the subject matter
of IR. By that I don’t mean the fact that there are a plurality of approaches—that
is, in principle, a good thing. But what I’ve noticed in my own work is that
we’re cutting up the subject matter, and that seems to me to be seriously
damaging to our understanding of international politics in general. We all know
that politics has something to do with economics and that economics has
something to do with norms and that norms have something do with politics—you
can’t properly explain either of those on its own. And yet, the approaches that
we have very often do focus on just one of these aspects of international
politics. And they say—no doubt about it—very interesting and insightful things
about them, but I’m not sure that this really tells us more about how
international politics in general works.
So it
seems to me that that is really the biggest challenge that we’re facing: that
we’re confronted with a discipline in which the subject matter is itself
divided into different issue areas, separate spaces, separate times. You study
America and then you don’t know anything about Europe; you do Europe and then
you don’t know anything about Africa. Most damagingly, it tells us nothing
about the relations between the different spaces, times, issues that are connected in and through global
politics.
seems to me that that is really the biggest challenge that we’re facing: that
we’re confronted with a discipline in which the subject matter is itself
divided into different issue areas, separate spaces, separate times. You study
America and then you don’t know anything about Europe; you do Europe and then
you don’t know anything about Africa. Most damagingly, it tells us nothing
about the relations between the different spaces, times, issues that are connected in and through global
politics.
As far as
solving that problem is concerned: the standard answer is that we need
interdisciplinary approaches because this fragmentation maps onto the
fragmentation of the social sciences. So we borrow from political science, or
economics, or philosophy.
solving that problem is concerned: the standard answer is that we need
interdisciplinary approaches because this fragmentation maps onto the
fragmentation of the social sciences. So we borrow from political science, or
economics, or philosophy.
But I
think that this doesn’t work. Interdisciplinary approaches are basically
starting from disciplines that are already separate and that you then somehow
try to put together. This either takes the form of applying the tools of one
discipline to the subject matter of another – that’s what you see in Waltz (Theory Talk #40)
when he applies tools of economic modeling to the subject matter of IR with the
result of an economistic understanding of international politics where states
behave like firms in the market. The alternative is to apply the tools of
different disciplines to the subject matter of IR and the outcome is again a fragmentation
albeit a different one. While this kind of importing can certainly contribute
to a different understanding of some aspect of IR, it does form problem since
each of these approaches grasps only that aspect of social life for whose
internal dynamics it was developed. Actually, it doesn’t tell us anything about
the relations between these different issue areas.
think that this doesn’t work. Interdisciplinary approaches are basically
starting from disciplines that are already separate and that you then somehow
try to put together. This either takes the form of applying the tools of one
discipline to the subject matter of another – that’s what you see in Waltz (Theory Talk #40)
when he applies tools of economic modeling to the subject matter of IR with the
result of an economistic understanding of international politics where states
behave like firms in the market. The alternative is to apply the tools of
different disciplines to the subject matter of IR and the outcome is again a fragmentation
albeit a different one. While this kind of importing can certainly contribute
to a different understanding of some aspect of IR, it does form problem since
each of these approaches grasps only that aspect of social life for whose
internal dynamics it was developed. Actually, it doesn’t tell us anything about
the relations between these different issue areas.
I think it
is more promising to use a pre-disciplinary approach. I use a lot of classical
authors and to me, the most valuable thing about classical theory is that a lot
of it is pre-disciplinary. What does that mean? It means that these people did
not actually start out from the assumption that economics was separate from
politics and that politics was separate from, say, religion. And so, what you
can get from classical theory is actually a theorization of the relations
between all of these different dimensions of political life. That gives us a
starting point in which these dimensions are connected. And we can then trace
the fragmentation that arises subsequently, identify its roots but also the
continuing connections that we miss when we begin with an already separated or
fragmented point of view.
is more promising to use a pre-disciplinary approach. I use a lot of classical
authors and to me, the most valuable thing about classical theory is that a lot
of it is pre-disciplinary. What does that mean? It means that these people did
not actually start out from the assumption that economics was separate from
politics and that politics was separate from, say, religion. And so, what you
can get from classical theory is actually a theorization of the relations
between all of these different dimensions of political life. That gives us a
starting point in which these dimensions are connected. And we can then trace
the fragmentation that arises subsequently, identify its roots but also the
continuing connections that we miss when we begin with an already separated or
fragmented point of view.
How did you arrive at where you currently are in
your thinking about IR?
your thinking about IR?
Well, I
have a particular interest in liberalism and liberal internationalism and especially
in the way in which liberalism relates to its ‘others’. I do think that the
root of this interest is actually quite biographical. Growing up in Germany in
the 1960’s and 70’s, there was only one politically correct or accepted
ideology—or worldview, if you want—which was liberalism. If you developed any
sort of halfway systematic critique of liberalism from the left, you were
immediately told ‘Well, if you don’t like it here, you can go across’—meaning
to East Germany—‘and live there’. If you developed any more systematic critique
of liberalism from the right, of course you were immediately accused of being a
Nazi. So I grew up in this extremely ‘intolerant’ liberal world; intolerant in the
sense that everything else was more or less taboo.
have a particular interest in liberalism and liberal internationalism and especially
in the way in which liberalism relates to its ‘others’. I do think that the
root of this interest is actually quite biographical. Growing up in Germany in
the 1960’s and 70’s, there was only one politically correct or accepted
ideology—or worldview, if you want—which was liberalism. If you developed any
sort of halfway systematic critique of liberalism from the left, you were
immediately told ‘Well, if you don’t like it here, you can go across’—meaning
to East Germany—‘and live there’. If you developed any more systematic critique
of liberalism from the right, of course you were immediately accused of being a
Nazi. So I grew up in this extremely ‘intolerant’ liberal world; intolerant in the
sense that everything else was more or less taboo.
And the
other thing that I’ve noticed at the time was that we had all these foreigners
living in Germany with whom I interacted on an everyday basis—lots of students
particularly from the Middle East, from Turkey, from Algeria, from Iran—with
lots of rich histories, all of whom had particular reasons to be in Germany.
Some of them just studied there but others had fled their countries for
political reasons. Now in my high school education, we learned nothing, and I
mean nothing, about these parts of
the world: where these people came from; what their histories were; their
languages—what were they doing here? It just didn’t exist in our curriculum.
I’ve always found that extremely frustrating and embarrassing. And if I wanted
to find out about these things, I had to go to my father’s encyclopedia and
read up on whatever part of the world I was interested in. I have always had
the feeling that there is a connection between liberalism, this dominant,
hegemonic liberalism on the one hand, and on the other, the exclusion of all
those other parts of the world that didn’t seem to be playing any role in its
self-understanding at all.
other thing that I’ve noticed at the time was that we had all these foreigners
living in Germany with whom I interacted on an everyday basis—lots of students
particularly from the Middle East, from Turkey, from Algeria, from Iran—with
lots of rich histories, all of whom had particular reasons to be in Germany.
Some of them just studied there but others had fled their countries for
political reasons. Now in my high school education, we learned nothing, and I
mean nothing, about these parts of
the world: where these people came from; what their histories were; their
languages—what were they doing here? It just didn’t exist in our curriculum.
I’ve always found that extremely frustrating and embarrassing. And if I wanted
to find out about these things, I had to go to my father’s encyclopedia and
read up on whatever part of the world I was interested in. I have always had
the feeling that there is a connection between liberalism, this dominant,
hegemonic liberalism on the one hand, and on the other, the exclusion of all
those other parts of the world that didn’t seem to be playing any role in its
self-understanding at all.
So I first
studied Arabic, Oriental studies, and Islamic sciences. It was only when I
found that Medieval Arabic poems, beautiful as they are, could not really tell
me anything about the contemporary Middle East either that I switched over to
political science and specialized in IR. And I basically pursued this interest
in the connection between liberalism and its ‘others’ in various different
forms ever since: my PhD thesis was about the perception of Mahatma Gandhi and
his movement in the Weimar Republic. And then, as you know, the book on the
invention of the state of nature (The
Cultural Construction of International Relations, 2000) is about the role
of Indigenous Americans in the construction of modern Western social sciences
and IR in particular. And right now, I am finishing a book on liberalism and
the role of colonialism in its constitution and reproduction. So this is the
red thread running through my intellectual interests.
studied Arabic, Oriental studies, and Islamic sciences. It was only when I
found that Medieval Arabic poems, beautiful as they are, could not really tell
me anything about the contemporary Middle East either that I switched over to
political science and specialized in IR. And I basically pursued this interest
in the connection between liberalism and its ‘others’ in various different
forms ever since: my PhD thesis was about the perception of Mahatma Gandhi and
his movement in the Weimar Republic. And then, as you know, the book on the
invention of the state of nature (The
Cultural Construction of International Relations, 2000) is about the role
of Indigenous Americans in the construction of modern Western social sciences
and IR in particular. And right now, I am finishing a book on liberalism and
the role of colonialism in its constitution and reproduction. So this is the
red thread running through my intellectual interests.
This
interest of mine also means that I am inspired mostly by books outside of IR.
When I was working on the discovery of the Americas, for instance, Todorov was very important, and also the work of Anthony Pagden.
Then there was a wonderful book by Urs Bitterly (Die ‘Wilden’ und die ‘Zivilisierten’) which exists in English only in a very, very abridged version. But
the German version is really a great resource—hundreds of pages—covering all
aspects of the impact of the discoveries on politics and social thinking,
religion in Europe. But, like I say, they are not IR books. I couldn’t honestly
say that there’s a particular book in IR that has been a great inspiration.
interest of mine also means that I am inspired mostly by books outside of IR.
When I was working on the discovery of the Americas, for instance, Todorov was very important, and also the work of Anthony Pagden.
Then there was a wonderful book by Urs Bitterly (Die ‘Wilden’ und die ‘Zivilisierten’) which exists in English only in a very, very abridged version. But
the German version is really a great resource—hundreds of pages—covering all
aspects of the impact of the discoveries on politics and social thinking,
religion in Europe. But, like I say, they are not IR books. I couldn’t honestly
say that there’s a particular book in IR that has been a great inspiration.
What would a student
need to become a specialist in IR or understand the world in a global way?
need to become a specialist in IR or understand the world in a global way?
If one
wants to become an IR scholar, I think there are three things that are needed.
The first is that you really need to feel passionately about international
politics because this is what provides the motivation—the drive—to actually
come up with your own thoughts and some sort of original contribution to
international relations thinking. Of course it’s possible to learn the existing
theories and methodologies and apply them even very well to particular cases,
but I think that tends to end up being a little bit mechanical. I do think that
a deep political interest in international politics is really quite necessary!
wants to become an IR scholar, I think there are three things that are needed.
The first is that you really need to feel passionately about international
politics because this is what provides the motivation—the drive—to actually
come up with your own thoughts and some sort of original contribution to
international relations thinking. Of course it’s possible to learn the existing
theories and methodologies and apply them even very well to particular cases,
but I think that tends to end up being a little bit mechanical. I do think that
a deep political interest in international politics is really quite necessary!
If one
wants to become a good IR scholar, and actually also have fun doing what one
does, I think the second thing—which seems like a contradiction, but such is
life—is that one has to be able to live with the fact that one very rarely, if
ever, has an impact on international politics. So while, on the one hand, one
needs to be driven by the desire to change things, one also needs to be able to
live with the fact that one rarely changes anything at all.
wants to become a good IR scholar, and actually also have fun doing what one
does, I think the second thing—which seems like a contradiction, but such is
life—is that one has to be able to live with the fact that one very rarely, if
ever, has an impact on international politics. So while, on the one hand, one
needs to be driven by the desire to change things, one also needs to be able to
live with the fact that one rarely changes anything at all.
And I
think the third thing is one really needs to love theory and thinking and
reflecting, partly because this is what we mostly do, but also because inasmuch
as we have an impact, I think it is mostly through teaching students. So, one
needs to be able to impart this love of thinking and theorizing and reflecting
on international politics to the students and enable them to think about IR in
a different way. So I think those would be the three main things.
think the third thing is one really needs to love theory and thinking and
reflecting, partly because this is what we mostly do, but also because inasmuch
as we have an impact, I think it is mostly through teaching students. So, one
needs to be able to impart this love of thinking and theorizing and reflecting
on international politics to the students and enable them to think about IR in
a different way. So I think those would be the three main things.
What is classical about classical political
theory? What makes it classic and why is it so important for understanding
contemporary international politics?
theory? What makes it classic and why is it so important for understanding
contemporary international politics?
What makes
classical theory classical? The first thing one has to say is that one cannot
define classical theory in terms of dates: on what grounds would we decide that
say, John Stuart Mill in the second half of the 19th century, was
classical, while Max Weber in the first half of the 20th century was
not? What makes classical theory classical, to my mind, is simply that it
reflects on a different historical context; classical authors or texts provide
us with a historical reference point. Now whether that historical reference
point lies 500 years back or only 50 years back doesn’t matter. What matters is
whether the text in question reflects on a different political context.
Obviously I would not call Robert Cox (Theory Talk #38)
‘classical theory’ because basically he comments on the same world that I’m
living in, so in a way, he doesn’t provide me with that reference point that’s
outside my own cup of tea.
classical theory classical? The first thing one has to say is that one cannot
define classical theory in terms of dates: on what grounds would we decide that
say, John Stuart Mill in the second half of the 19th century, was
classical, while Max Weber in the first half of the 20th century was
not? What makes classical theory classical, to my mind, is simply that it
reflects on a different historical context; classical authors or texts provide
us with a historical reference point. Now whether that historical reference
point lies 500 years back or only 50 years back doesn’t matter. What matters is
whether the text in question reflects on a different political context.
Obviously I would not call Robert Cox (Theory Talk #38)
‘classical theory’ because basically he comments on the same world that I’m
living in, so in a way, he doesn’t provide me with that reference point that’s
outside my own cup of tea.
As I said
earlier, what is most fruitful about classical theorists is, at least for the
older ones, that they tended not to think in disciplinary terms—disciplines did
not exist. So, in classical texts, what strikes you most, is that politics,
economics, religion, domestic and international are not separated from each
other, and it gives you a good understanding of where society and international
society is coming from in an integrated way.
earlier, what is most fruitful about classical theorists is, at least for the
older ones, that they tended not to think in disciplinary terms—disciplines did
not exist. So, in classical texts, what strikes you most, is that politics,
economics, religion, domestic and international are not separated from each
other, and it gives you a good understanding of where society and international
society is coming from in an integrated way.
We can use
classical theory to look at what actually inspired people to properly
distinguish and separate out domestic from international politics: what
actually led to the separation between politics and economics? And this is what
we can’t really do so easily when we start from today, because we’re going to
read the present fragmentation back into history. We’re going to go back to
ancient Greeks and identify economics and politics as separate issues, which
doesn’t work and distorts the classics, too. I think what really is important
is that we read these classical texts in their proper historical context. If we
take them out of their historical context we end up with ‘timeless wisdom’, and
that does not allow us to bridge any gaps at all.
classical theory to look at what actually inspired people to properly
distinguish and separate out domestic from international politics: what
actually led to the separation between politics and economics? And this is what
we can’t really do so easily when we start from today, because we’re going to
read the present fragmentation back into history. We’re going to go back to
ancient Greeks and identify economics and politics as separate issues, which
doesn’t work and distorts the classics, too. I think what really is important
is that we read these classical texts in their proper historical context. If we
take them out of their historical context we end up with ‘timeless wisdom’, and
that does not allow us to bridge any gaps at all.
Do you consider that much of the use of
classical theorists by IR scholars is actually a disfiguration of the classical
authors by taking them out of their historical context?
classical theorists by IR scholars is actually a disfiguration of the classical
authors by taking them out of their historical context?
I think,
traditionally, definitely: the original traditional mainstream IR scholars that
engaged with classical authors (many of them, anyway) read these authors very
much out of context and they were, of course, also not interested in that
context. They were exactly not interested
in the connections between different issue areas, precisely because their goal
was to set up IR as a separate discipline. They were basically saying ‘look,
political science and thought has proven unable to deal with the question of
peace and war and other international issues. And so we need to look at this
international area in particular and focus on that alone’—which, in the
context, made perfect sense, but it also meant that classical authors were read
in a very selective way. Luckily, this doesn’t really happen any longer, but that
is how classical authors first came to play a role in IR.
traditionally, definitely: the original traditional mainstream IR scholars that
engaged with classical authors (many of them, anyway) read these authors very
much out of context and they were, of course, also not interested in that
context. They were exactly not interested
in the connections between different issue areas, precisely because their goal
was to set up IR as a separate discipline. They were basically saying ‘look,
political science and thought has proven unable to deal with the question of
peace and war and other international issues. And so we need to look at this
international area in particular and focus on that alone’—which, in the
context, made perfect sense, but it also meant that classical authors were read
in a very selective way. Luckily, this doesn’t really happen any longer, but that
is how classical authors first came to play a role in IR.
I also
think that the idea of timeless wisdom and the aim to find answers to our contemporary
problems in classical theory is wrong. I don’t read them to get answers; I read
them, for analytical purposes, to establish historical continuities and
differences—and these enable me to analyze the contemporary problems I am
interested in better. But this doesn’t provide answers, as far as I am
concerned.
think that the idea of timeless wisdom and the aim to find answers to our contemporary
problems in classical theory is wrong. I don’t read them to get answers; I read
them, for analytical purposes, to establish historical continuities and
differences—and these enable me to analyze the contemporary problems I am
interested in better. But this doesn’t provide answers, as far as I am
concerned.
I think
there is no other way of understanding contemporary problems or critically
investigate and analyze contemporary concepts than by finding a reference point
outside—whether spatial or temporal. Nevertheless, such analyses will always
remain an interpretation; they will always be relative. There’s always the
truth/power connection and I don’t think it can be severed. So I think it’s a
case of just keeping at it and focusing on the dominant nexus at any one time.
there is no other way of understanding contemporary problems or critically
investigate and analyze contemporary concepts than by finding a reference point
outside—whether spatial or temporal. Nevertheless, such analyses will always
remain an interpretation; they will always be relative. There’s always the
truth/power connection and I don’t think it can be severed. So I think it’s a
case of just keeping at it and focusing on the dominant nexus at any one time.
There is a view that is popular with many IR
theorists or articles to say that we are living in a time that is a radical
break with the past, both meaning we need a radically novel approach to
understand the issues. How can we judge this issue of whether the classical
theorists still exert influence or not or whether we can speak about radical
breaks with the past?
theorists or articles to say that we are living in a time that is a radical
break with the past, both meaning we need a radically novel approach to
understand the issues. How can we judge this issue of whether the classical
theorists still exert influence or not or whether we can speak about radical
breaks with the past?
I think
there are two different issues here. On the one hand, empirically, there is
absolutely no question that classical authors themselves clearly play a role in
the present. They do so in broadly three different ways.
there are two different issues here. On the one hand, empirically, there is
absolutely no question that classical authors themselves clearly play a role in
the present. They do so in broadly three different ways.
One is
that they are being used quite widely to justify particular policies. Kant, for
example, is today widely used not just in academic approaches like
cosmopolitanism or the democratic peace thesis but also in daily newspapers and
by politicians in support of certain policies. Think of Kagan’s identification
of Europeans as Kantians and Americans as Hobbesians (Power and Weakness, read it here),
which was taken up in newspapers. The other day, I read an article in the
Guardian that used Adam Smith. Second, they are being used in IR to structure
our thinking, in providing justifications for particular schools of thought –
Hobbesianism/realism, Kantianism/liberalism, Grotianism/English school, and so
on.
that they are being used quite widely to justify particular policies. Kant, for
example, is today widely used not just in academic approaches like
cosmopolitanism or the democratic peace thesis but also in daily newspapers and
by politicians in support of certain policies. Think of Kagan’s identification
of Europeans as Kantians and Americans as Hobbesians (Power and Weakness, read it here),
which was taken up in newspapers. The other day, I read an article in the
Guardian that used Adam Smith. Second, they are being used in IR to structure
our thinking, in providing justifications for particular schools of thought –
Hobbesianism/realism, Kantianism/liberalism, Grotianism/English school, and so
on.
And I
think the third way in which classical theory plays an obvious role is that it
simply provides the general cultural backdrop for political thinking in the
West in general and IR in particular. These authors were used to define the
subject matter of the discipline, so there is a kind of historical continuity
there.
think the third way in which classical theory plays an obvious role is that it
simply provides the general cultural backdrop for political thinking in the
West in general and IR in particular. These authors were used to define the
subject matter of the discipline, so there is a kind of historical continuity
there.
But the
more interesting question is the one about the radical break. Personally, I
don’t think much about claims about radical breaks, precisely because I think
there are a lot of continuities. I am always struck by how many continuities
there are with the past. However, I think the more important question is: if
you want to make a radical break with existing approaches to IR, how are you
going to do this? Since we can’t pick radically new concepts out of thin air we
are forced to develop them by reinterpreting the past. I can’t see any other
way. Obviously one can do all kinds of reformulations, but there will always be
continuities. So I’m quite suspicious of claims regarding radical breaks.
more interesting question is the one about the radical break. Personally, I
don’t think much about claims about radical breaks, precisely because I think
there are a lot of continuities. I am always struck by how many continuities
there are with the past. However, I think the more important question is: if
you want to make a radical break with existing approaches to IR, how are you
going to do this? Since we can’t pick radically new concepts out of thin air we
are forced to develop them by reinterpreting the past. I can’t see any other
way. Obviously one can do all kinds of reformulations, but there will always be
continuities. So I’m quite suspicious of claims regarding radical breaks.
The idea of anarchy is foundational for realist
IR theory and it is basically a juxtaposition to the interstate level of the
political philosophy concept of the state of nature, which is itself a
hypothetical construct of social contract theories. What does it matter that
it’s a hypothetical or cultural construct?
IR theory and it is basically a juxtaposition to the interstate level of the
political philosophy concept of the state of nature, which is itself a
hypothetical construct of social contract theories. What does it matter that
it’s a hypothetical or cultural construct?
I think it
matters a lot because when you present a particular idea as a hypothetical
construct, what you do is you simply hide the fact that it was developed in a
particular kind of context—that it is an abstraction from a particular context
and the interactions that have given rise to this concept. So this abstraction,
if you present it as hypothetical, hides what those conditions were and
therefore also hides the baggage that these concepts carry with them.
matters a lot because when you present a particular idea as a hypothetical
construct, what you do is you simply hide the fact that it was developed in a
particular kind of context—that it is an abstraction from a particular context
and the interactions that have given rise to this concept. So this abstraction,
if you present it as hypothetical, hides what those conditions were and
therefore also hides the baggage that these concepts carry with them.
In the
case of the state of nature, I’ve argued that it was actually developed (or
reformulated) in the context of the discovery of the Americas, the discovery of
people who, according to the bible, were not supposed to exist: they didn’t fit
into already existing Christian world views; they didn’t fit into the legal
tools we had to deal with other people. So the state of nature was a solution
to this problem in that it allowed the Europeans to integrate these new peoples
and lands into their worldview, but also to integrate them politically and
economically and so to justify conquest in the Americas.
case of the state of nature, I’ve argued that it was actually developed (or
reformulated) in the context of the discovery of the Americas, the discovery of
people who, according to the bible, were not supposed to exist: they didn’t fit
into already existing Christian world views; they didn’t fit into the legal
tools we had to deal with other people. So the state of nature was a solution
to this problem in that it allowed the Europeans to integrate these new peoples
and lands into their worldview, but also to integrate them politically and
economically and so to justify conquest in the Americas.
If we
understand the state of nature as a hypothetical concept, then we lose track of
the fact that this concept was developed in order to establish hierarchical
relations between the Europeans and non-Europeans at the time. And it carries
that baggage with it in that it allows us to develop conceptions of development
and underdevelopment, conceptions of progress and backwardness, or in the 19th
century, concepts of civilization and barbarism—all of these are based on the
assumption that there is a state of nature and a linear logic of development
for humanity as a whole. And I think, unless we show that these are actually
cultural constructs and not hypothetical categories; that these are actually
political concepts that were developed for particular purposes and do not
describe the way in which the world works in any kind of meaningful or
defendable way, then we carry on reproducing those kinds of hierarchies.
understand the state of nature as a hypothetical concept, then we lose track of
the fact that this concept was developed in order to establish hierarchical
relations between the Europeans and non-Europeans at the time. And it carries
that baggage with it in that it allows us to develop conceptions of development
and underdevelopment, conceptions of progress and backwardness, or in the 19th
century, concepts of civilization and barbarism—all of these are based on the
assumption that there is a state of nature and a linear logic of development
for humanity as a whole. And I think, unless we show that these are actually
cultural constructs and not hypothetical categories; that these are actually
political concepts that were developed for particular purposes and do not
describe the way in which the world works in any kind of meaningful or
defendable way, then we carry on reproducing those kinds of hierarchies.
And this
is not particular to the concept of the ‘state of nature’. I think all such
purported ‘universals’ are never really neutral—they are always abstractions
from particular social and political settings and practices and institutions
derived from these particular circumstances. Of course, they exist as
theoretical concepts. But I think as soon as you put practice back in—as soon
as you take a concept like that and either look at where it came from or how
you could apply it in practice—it immediately turns into a particular concept.
So I think empirically, we only have particular concepts and never universal
ones.
is not particular to the concept of the ‘state of nature’. I think all such
purported ‘universals’ are never really neutral—they are always abstractions
from particular social and political settings and practices and institutions
derived from these particular circumstances. Of course, they exist as
theoretical concepts. But I think as soon as you put practice back in—as soon
as you take a concept like that and either look at where it came from or how
you could apply it in practice—it immediately turns into a particular concept.
So I think empirically, we only have particular concepts and never universal
ones.
One sees the term ‘liberal’ everywhere in
IR—especially among more critical approaches. Yet it is hard to pin it down
what it actually means… Is it a historically constant term and what do we do
with such a contested concept?
IR—especially among more critical approaches. Yet it is hard to pin it down
what it actually means… Is it a historically constant term and what do we do
with such a contested concept?
Liberalism,
first of all, is a very contested concept that entails both continuities and
changes. The reason for the contestation lies partly in the contradictions that
are inherent in liberalism. For example, historically, liberalism was
passionately anti-democratic, and now it is intimately associated with
democracy! It was historically deeply implicated in colonialism and then it was
committed to the principle of self-determination—and now we see liberals again
advocating a move to neo-colonialism!
first of all, is a very contested concept that entails both continuities and
changes. The reason for the contestation lies partly in the contradictions that
are inherent in liberalism. For example, historically, liberalism was
passionately anti-democratic, and now it is intimately associated with
democracy! It was historically deeply implicated in colonialism and then it was
committed to the principle of self-determination—and now we see liberals again
advocating a move to neo-colonialism!
These
contradictions, I think, lead observers of liberalism to split it up in a
variety of ways – and then to fight over its proper meaning. So you get people
understanding liberalism on the basis of its empirical behavior; others
approaching liberalism on the basis of its core norms; others yet see
liberalism in terms of its political institutions; or in terms of its economic
foundations like private property, free-trade, markets, all that. These divisions
are reflected in the large number of different liberal approaches—republican
liberalism, commercial liberalism, normative liberalism, sociological
liberalism—you name it, it’s there! So I think it’s the historical richness and
diversity, but also contradictory nature of liberalism that leads people to
come up with all these different conceptions of it.
contradictions, I think, lead observers of liberalism to split it up in a
variety of ways – and then to fight over its proper meaning. So you get people
understanding liberalism on the basis of its empirical behavior; others
approaching liberalism on the basis of its core norms; others yet see
liberalism in terms of its political institutions; or in terms of its economic
foundations like private property, free-trade, markets, all that. These divisions
are reflected in the large number of different liberal approaches—republican
liberalism, commercial liberalism, normative liberalism, sociological
liberalism—you name it, it’s there! So I think it’s the historical richness and
diversity, but also contradictory nature of liberalism that leads people to
come up with all these different conceptions of it.
Now, to my
mind, there is a core to liberalism and I would follow Locke’s theoretical construction in which private property establishes individual liberty; individual liberty
then leads to liberal political culture; and the need to reflect this liberty
in political institutions which results in government by consent or democracy;
and this government’s main purpose is to protect private property, because it’s
the basis of individual liberty. So I think in terms of the theoretical
construction, these things hang together; they are mutually constitutive. There
is no such thing as liberalism only understood in terms of political
institutions. There are lots of states with democratic political institutions,
but we do not consider them all as liberal. There are lots of states out there
that are capitalist but that is not enough to make them liberal.
mind, there is a core to liberalism and I would follow Locke’s theoretical construction in which private property establishes individual liberty; individual liberty
then leads to liberal political culture; and the need to reflect this liberty
in political institutions which results in government by consent or democracy;
and this government’s main purpose is to protect private property, because it’s
the basis of individual liberty. So I think in terms of the theoretical
construction, these things hang together; they are mutually constitutive. There
is no such thing as liberalism only understood in terms of political
institutions. There are lots of states with democratic political institutions,
but we do not consider them all as liberal. There are lots of states out there
that are capitalist but that is not enough to make them liberal.
So to me,
all three elements—normative, political, and economic—hang together in
liberalism and you only have liberalism if you have all of these constituting
each other. And I think historically, there are two more dimensions that are
really important for liberalism—crucial, actually: one is that of course in the
time when Locke came up with this idea, there were only very few people who
were constituted as liberal individuals through private property. Most people
didn’t have private property and
could therefore also not be expected to maintain liberal principles in
politics, which is why they had to be excluded from equal political rights,
which is why liberalism originally was actually anti-democratic.
all three elements—normative, political, and economic—hang together in
liberalism and you only have liberalism if you have all of these constituting
each other. And I think historically, there are two more dimensions that are
really important for liberalism—crucial, actually: one is that of course in the
time when Locke came up with this idea, there were only very few people who
were constituted as liberal individuals through private property. Most people
didn’t have private property and
could therefore also not be expected to maintain liberal principles in
politics, which is why they had to be excluded from equal political rights,
which is why liberalism originally was actually anti-democratic.
This
disjuncture between theory and practice led to the introduction of a liberal
philosophy of history which presents liberal norms like equality as rooted in
the nature of the human being but historically displaced and only recoverable
in the future. It explains the absence of empirical evidence for liberal claims
and establishes a political program (and promises) for the future. This
philosophy of history provides the basis for the temporal fragmentation of
liberalism—with its weaknesses (generally, though not always) relegated to the
past, its ideal realization projected into the future, and the present
constituting a mixed bag of liberal achievements and failings.
disjuncture between theory and practice led to the introduction of a liberal
philosophy of history which presents liberal norms like equality as rooted in
the nature of the human being but historically displaced and only recoverable
in the future. It explains the absence of empirical evidence for liberal claims
and establishes a political program (and promises) for the future. This
philosophy of history provides the basis for the temporal fragmentation of
liberalism—with its weaknesses (generally, though not always) relegated to the
past, its ideal realization projected into the future, and the present
constituting a mixed bag of liberal achievements and failings.
And
second, you get the distinction between domestic and international politics
which allows liberal actors to appropriate property abroad, to import the
economic benefits and to export the negative political consequences thereof.
And this distinction provides the basis for domestic political emancipation and
economic development based on international ‘beggar thy neighbor’ policies. In other words, it provides the basis for the domestic/international
separation—with liberalism generally defined in terms of its domestic
achievements.
second, you get the distinction between domestic and international politics
which allows liberal actors to appropriate property abroad, to import the
economic benefits and to export the negative political consequences thereof.
And this distinction provides the basis for domestic political emancipation and
economic development based on international ‘beggar thy neighbor’ policies. In other words, it provides the basis for the domestic/international
separation—with liberalism generally defined in terms of its domestic
achievements.
I think
this accounts both for the continuities as well as for the discontinuities that
we have in liberalism. Continuous is the need for a government that protects
private property but how this can be achieved depends on the political context
that accounts for the discontinuities.
this accounts both for the continuities as well as for the discontinuities that
we have in liberalism. Continuous is the need for a government that protects
private property but how this can be achieved depends on the political context
that accounts for the discontinuities.
So
liberalism is a dynamic process which covers all the core areas of life and
constitutes and re-constitutes all of us in its image. But that of course includes
the non-liberal parts. It is an incredibly dynamic political force, which is
much more powerful than liberals themselves realize in that it constitutes
nonliberals as well. At the same time, it is less powerful than they claim in
that its internal contradictions prevent it from ever generally realizing its
universal promises. And to me, realism is actually a part of liberalism;
realism, in a way, is the intellectual other that is produced by liberalism.
liberalism is a dynamic process which covers all the core areas of life and
constitutes and re-constitutes all of us in its image. But that of course includes
the non-liberal parts. It is an incredibly dynamic political force, which is
much more powerful than liberals themselves realize in that it constitutes
nonliberals as well. At the same time, it is less powerful than they claim in
that its internal contradictions prevent it from ever generally realizing its
universal promises. And to me, realism is actually a part of liberalism;
realism, in a way, is the intellectual other that is produced by liberalism.
But I am
sitting here criticizing liberalism—I’ve made it kind of my life’s work to
explore this concept and to be quite critical about it—and yet, I would say in
many ways, I’m a liberal! I can’t help being a liberal! I’ve been brought up
within a liberal world order and to me, that world order was already liberal
during the Cold War in that Communism—or Marxism if you want to put it
intellectually—is also a product of liberal policies, not something outside of
it.
sitting here criticizing liberalism—I’ve made it kind of my life’s work to
explore this concept and to be quite critical about it—and yet, I would say in
many ways, I’m a liberal! I can’t help being a liberal! I’ve been brought up
within a liberal world order and to me, that world order was already liberal
during the Cold War in that Communism—or Marxism if you want to put it
intellectually—is also a product of liberal policies, not something outside of
it.
You look at much of the origins of universal
concepts in modern political philosophy in concrete colonial encounters. Can
one say that the origins of Western thought are by nature not purely Western,
but always distributed?
concepts in modern political philosophy in concrete colonial encounters. Can
one say that the origins of Western thought are by nature not purely Western,
but always distributed?
I do think
that what usually counts as ‘Western’ or ‘European’ concepts or institutions
have largely been developed in more or less extensive interaction with
non-Western or non-European societies. In fact, we can only call something
Western or European if we first assume that there is a Non-western alternative
out there. In that sense, I do think that Western institutions are ultimately
not ‘Western’. But in a more narrow sense—of course they are. We can say
Francisco de Vitoria was a Western author in that he was born in Spain and was very much shaped by
that culture and so on—never mind how important the discovery of the Americas
were for his work. So in a narrower sense, it’s not entirely meaningless to use
those terms, but ultimately, I think they are misleading in suggesting that
these are different, separate, independent developments or entities.
that what usually counts as ‘Western’ or ‘European’ concepts or institutions
have largely been developed in more or less extensive interaction with
non-Western or non-European societies. In fact, we can only call something
Western or European if we first assume that there is a Non-western alternative
out there. In that sense, I do think that Western institutions are ultimately
not ‘Western’. But in a more narrow sense—of course they are. We can say
Francisco de Vitoria was a Western author in that he was born in Spain and was very much shaped by
that culture and so on—never mind how important the discovery of the Americas
were for his work. So in a narrower sense, it’s not entirely meaningless to use
those terms, but ultimately, I think they are misleading in suggesting that
these are different, separate, independent developments or entities.
What are
the implications of recognizing that? Well, they are highly relative! They
force us to constantly reflect on the constitutive role of others for our own
identities and polities. But I would say that I don’t think that this is
particular to Western thought. All theoretical conceptions, worldviews,
identities reflect the nature of interaction of all the people that play a role
in their constitution to a greater or lesser degree. So I don’t think this is a
terrible shortcoming of European thought.
the implications of recognizing that? Well, they are highly relative! They
force us to constantly reflect on the constitutive role of others for our own
identities and polities. But I would say that I don’t think that this is
particular to Western thought. All theoretical conceptions, worldviews,
identities reflect the nature of interaction of all the people that play a role
in their constitution to a greater or lesser degree. So I don’t think this is a
terrible shortcoming of European thought.
Beate Jahn studied Political Science,
Sociology and German Literature at the University of Frankfurt, Germany, where
she received her PhD in 1991. She subsequently taught International
Relations at the Graduate Faculty of the New School University in New York.
From 1994 to 1997 she received full research funding to write The Cultural Construction of International
Relations (2000) for which she received her Habilitation (higher
doctorate) in 2001. In 1998 Beate Jahn was appointed Lecturer in
International Relations at the University of Sussex. She is currently Director
of the Centre for Advanced International Theory and will take
over as editor-in-chief of the European Journal of International Relations in
January 2013.
Sociology and German Literature at the University of Frankfurt, Germany, where
she received her PhD in 1991. She subsequently taught International
Relations at the Graduate Faculty of the New School University in New York.
From 1994 to 1997 she received full research funding to write The Cultural Construction of International
Relations (2000) for which she received her Habilitation (higher
doctorate) in 2001. In 1998 Beate Jahn was appointed Lecturer in
International Relations at the University of Sussex. She is currently Director
of the Centre for Advanced International Theory and will take
over as editor-in-chief of the European Journal of International Relations in
January 2013.
Related links
- Faculty Profile at U-Sussex
- Read Jahn’s IR and the state of
nature: the cultural origins of a ruling ideology (Review of International Studies, 1999) here (pdf). - Read the
first chapter of The Cultural
Construction of International Relations (2000, Palgrave) here (pdf) - Read Jahn’s Barbarian thoughts: imperialism in the philosophy of John Stuart Mill (Review of International
Studies, 2005) here (pdf) - Read
Jahn’s Humanitarian intervention – What’s in a name? (International Politics,
2012) here (pdf)
