Yan Xuetong on Chinese Realism, the Tsinghua
School of International Relations, and the Impossibility of Harmony
School of International Relations, and the Impossibility of Harmony
Yan Xuetong is one of
most-heard voices in field of IR in China. He identifies himself as a realist,
but strongly believes in the need for novel approaches. His work brings to the
debate new IR concepts drawn from his study of the political thinkers and
social theorists from the ‘Golden Age of Chinese Thought’. In this Talk, he elaborates
the Tsinghua School’s approach to IR theory; defends Chinese realism; and discusses
China’s difficulty in defining her place in the world.
most-heard voices in field of IR in China. He identifies himself as a realist,
but strongly believes in the need for novel approaches. His work brings to the
debate new IR concepts drawn from his study of the political thinkers and
social theorists from the ‘Golden Age of Chinese Thought’. In this Talk, he elaborates
the Tsinghua School’s approach to IR theory; defends Chinese realism; and discusses
China’s difficulty in defining her place in the world.
What is, according to you, the
central challenge or principal debate in International Relations? And what is
your position regarding this challenge/in this debate?
central challenge or principal debate in International Relations? And what is
your position regarding this challenge/in this debate?
I
think the most important debate in IR today is about the relationship between
China and the US, that is, the main question is whether the competition between
China and the US will result in a disaster—a repetition of the many examples
throughout history when two great powers collide—meaning explicitly whether
China’s rise will lead to wars between the major powers; the second issue is
whether it’s possible for China to become a new superpower peacefully; and the
third issue, thoroughly explored in my book, is whether China will behave like
the historical hegemon or whether China will be a new kind of hegemon (Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese
Power, 2011).
think the most important debate in IR today is about the relationship between
China and the US, that is, the main question is whether the competition between
China and the US will result in a disaster—a repetition of the many examples
throughout history when two great powers collide—meaning explicitly whether
China’s rise will lead to wars between the major powers; the second issue is
whether it’s possible for China to become a new superpower peacefully; and the
third issue, thoroughly explored in my book, is whether China will behave like
the historical hegemon or whether China will be a new kind of hegemon (Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese
Power, 2011).
Firstly,
talking about whether the rise of China will result in a world war, my argument
is very clear: it is simply impossible. The reason is not because China is ‘nicer’
or the Chinese are ‘more civilized’ than others; rather, the main underlying
factor is the destructive power of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons prevent
nuclear powers from going to war against each other, because that would lead to
the total destruction of the human species. That means there are no winners in
a nuclear war between two major powers and everyone is a loser. The two powers’
rationality insures that neither China nor the US would try to use nuclear war
to achieve their goals for increased international status or international
dominance. This is why I have great confidence that China’s rise does not have
any possibility of escalating into world war. Even a smaller scale war is
unlikely.
talking about whether the rise of China will result in a world war, my argument
is very clear: it is simply impossible. The reason is not because China is ‘nicer’
or the Chinese are ‘more civilized’ than others; rather, the main underlying
factor is the destructive power of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons prevent
nuclear powers from going to war against each other, because that would lead to
the total destruction of the human species. That means there are no winners in
a nuclear war between two major powers and everyone is a loser. The two powers’
rationality insures that neither China nor the US would try to use nuclear war
to achieve their goals for increased international status or international
dominance. This is why I have great confidence that China’s rise does not have
any possibility of escalating into world war. Even a smaller scale war is
unlikely.
The
second question is about whether China can achieve its goals peacefully. That
means whether China would use other kinds of warfare. I would tend to say this
kind of danger is only slight. I cannot rule it out, but the likelihood is quite
small. The reason is—as I outline in the article just published in the Chinese
Journal of International Politics [CJIP]—that ‘it’s a football game rather than
a boxing match’ (read full article here).
If we compare the Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet
Union to a boxing match, we might compare that between China and the United
States to a game of football. The former was characterized predominately by
violence, and whereas the latter will involve occasional conflicts, violence is
not the primary means. The victor of Sino-US strategic competition will be the
state that can increase its domestic power while at the same time maintaining an
appropriate foreign policy strategy.
second question is about whether China can achieve its goals peacefully. That
means whether China would use other kinds of warfare. I would tend to say this
kind of danger is only slight. I cannot rule it out, but the likelihood is quite
small. The reason is—as I outline in the article just published in the Chinese
Journal of International Politics [CJIP]—that ‘it’s a football game rather than
a boxing match’ (read full article here).
If we compare the Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet
Union to a boxing match, we might compare that between China and the United
States to a game of football. The former was characterized predominately by
violence, and whereas the latter will involve occasional conflicts, violence is
not the primary means. The victor of Sino-US strategic competition will be the
state that can increase its domestic power while at the same time maintaining an
appropriate foreign policy strategy.
As
for the third question, whether China will behave like the historical hegemon
or whether China will be a new kind of hegemon, I think—based on Chinese
thought—we can divide ‘hegemony’ into three types: humane authority, hegemony,
and tyranny. Certainly China will not be a tyrannical superpower. As for
hegemony, I think China should not behave like the US. China should behave
differently from the US, by providing a different type of international
leadership for the world. I am advocating for China to be a humane authority.
Humane authority is based on both material power and political power. Humane
authority needs to have an efficient political system to mobilize both domestic
and international resources. Humane means a superpower has more friends and
receives more international support than others. China should have more allies
than the US, but unfortunately at this moment, we fall far short. Being humane
not only requires having an ample number of allies but also being moral and
having strong leadership, or as people nowadays like to say, undertaking more
international responsibility. Simply stated: being humane means having more
friends and having a good political system that can mobilize both domestic and
international support. Authority means, first of all, having huge material
power and secondly, undertaking more international responsibility. If a state
is not capable of using these resources, it means it has no power.
for the third question, whether China will behave like the historical hegemon
or whether China will be a new kind of hegemon, I think—based on Chinese
thought—we can divide ‘hegemony’ into three types: humane authority, hegemony,
and tyranny. Certainly China will not be a tyrannical superpower. As for
hegemony, I think China should not behave like the US. China should behave
differently from the US, by providing a different type of international
leadership for the world. I am advocating for China to be a humane authority.
Humane authority is based on both material power and political power. Humane
authority needs to have an efficient political system to mobilize both domestic
and international resources. Humane means a superpower has more friends and
receives more international support than others. China should have more allies
than the US, but unfortunately at this moment, we fall far short. Being humane
not only requires having an ample number of allies but also being moral and
having strong leadership, or as people nowadays like to say, undertaking more
international responsibility. Simply stated: being humane means having more
friends and having a good political system that can mobilize both domestic and
international support. Authority means, first of all, having huge material
power and secondly, undertaking more international responsibility. If a state
is not capable of using these resources, it means it has no power.
In
my book I argue that China should consider what kind of leadership we can
provide to the world. China should shift from its focus from economic
development to a harmonious society. China should consider placing more
emphasis on international responsibility, international leadership and making
alliances and moral norms for the world.
my book I argue that China should consider what kind of leadership we can
provide to the world. China should shift from its focus from economic
development to a harmonious society. China should consider placing more
emphasis on international responsibility, international leadership and making
alliances and moral norms for the world.
How did you arrive at where you
currently are in your thinking about IR?
currently are in your thinking about IR?
I
started my research of ancient Chinese political thought in 2005. At that time
there was a debate in China about whether China should establish a Chinese
theory of international relations. Because of my training at Berkeley, I have
been strongly influenced by the scientific methodology and believe it is the
wrong approach to develop a single IR theory to represent all of China. Deng Xiaoping,
the great reformer, coined the phrase, ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’.
Subsequently, many people try to use this ‘Chinese characteristic’ and apply it
to develop a new IR theory. However, it is impossible to have a single unified
IR theory with Chinese characteristics because China is rich in both population
diversity and philosophical thought. Therefore, it is not feasible that a
single school of thought or theory could represent the entirety of Chinese
thinking. This motivated me to look into the diverse literature of ancient
Chinese thought to better understand different ways of thinking. I want to
create something universal, applicable not only to China, but the world.
started my research of ancient Chinese political thought in 2005. At that time
there was a debate in China about whether China should establish a Chinese
theory of international relations. Because of my training at Berkeley, I have
been strongly influenced by the scientific methodology and believe it is the
wrong approach to develop a single IR theory to represent all of China. Deng Xiaoping,
the great reformer, coined the phrase, ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’.
Subsequently, many people try to use this ‘Chinese characteristic’ and apply it
to develop a new IR theory. However, it is impossible to have a single unified
IR theory with Chinese characteristics because China is rich in both population
diversity and philosophical thought. Therefore, it is not feasible that a
single school of thought or theory could represent the entirety of Chinese
thinking. This motivated me to look into the diverse literature of ancient
Chinese thought to better understand different ways of thinking. I want to
create something universal, applicable not only to China, but the world.
The
second factor is that Chinese scholars were fond of constructivism, relying
heavily on Alexander Wendt’s (Theory Talk #3)
‘Social Theory of International Politics’, and had no interests in developing new
theories. It is an important book, but we cannot rely on it forever. By 2005 I
was already tired of Wendt’s ideas, so I decided to pursue new theoretical
studies.
second factor is that Chinese scholars were fond of constructivism, relying
heavily on Alexander Wendt’s (Theory Talk #3)
‘Social Theory of International Politics’, and had no interests in developing new
theories. It is an important book, but we cannot rely on it forever. By 2005 I
was already tired of Wendt’s ideas, so I decided to pursue new theoretical
studies.
I
am, first of all, a realist, so I find many faults in Wendt’s theory, including
two major problems: first, his theory cannot explain clearly the mechanism of
mutual interaction, a core concept for his theory. He argues that the change of
international norms is based on mutual interaction between states, but he
cannot explain what changes what. Is it the people’s concepts that change behavior
or people’s behavior that changes their concepts? Readers cannot really
understand what mutual interaction is in essence. According to scientific
standards, each step of mutual interaction should be clear: what happens first
and what result does it lead to. The second problem is that his concept of the
evolution of international norms is unilinear. I believe that is historically
inaccurate. He believes that international norms evolve from the Hobbesian
culture to Lockean culture and then to Kantian culture. In fact, human history
never developed in a unilinear fashion. It might rather resemble a tree,
branching out in all directions. So I have a problem with his view of history,
and that was really one important factor which motivated me to study ancient
Chinese thought. I want to know what the ancient Chinese thinkers thought about
history, and how did they view the future of human society in two thousand
years ago.
am, first of all, a realist, so I find many faults in Wendt’s theory, including
two major problems: first, his theory cannot explain clearly the mechanism of
mutual interaction, a core concept for his theory. He argues that the change of
international norms is based on mutual interaction between states, but he
cannot explain what changes what. Is it the people’s concepts that change behavior
or people’s behavior that changes their concepts? Readers cannot really
understand what mutual interaction is in essence. According to scientific
standards, each step of mutual interaction should be clear: what happens first
and what result does it lead to. The second problem is that his concept of the
evolution of international norms is unilinear. I believe that is historically
inaccurate. He believes that international norms evolve from the Hobbesian
culture to Lockean culture and then to Kantian culture. In fact, human history
never developed in a unilinear fashion. It might rather resemble a tree,
branching out in all directions. So I have a problem with his view of history,
and that was really one important factor which motivated me to study ancient
Chinese thought. I want to know what the ancient Chinese thinkers thought about
history, and how did they view the future of human society in two thousand
years ago.
I
got interested in pre-Qin history for various reasons. Growing up in China, we learn from a very young age about
the Spring and Autumn period and the Warring States period,
and the very complicated relationships among the powers of those periods. I
think there is a similarity to the situation today. Three thousand years ago, the
Western Zhou dynasty was like the US hegemon after the Cold War, a unipolar system. The Chinese term
we would use for that is 王权
[wangquan]. After the Western Zhou Dynasty was the Spring and Autumn period
there were some thirty countries within the realm, which by the Warring States
period was reduced to seven, before being united as one country in the Qin Dynasty
[in the third century BC]. This history is known by every Chinese kid.
got interested in pre-Qin history for various reasons. Growing up in China, we learn from a very young age about
the Spring and Autumn period and the Warring States period,
and the very complicated relationships among the powers of those periods. I
think there is a similarity to the situation today. Three thousand years ago, the
Western Zhou dynasty was like the US hegemon after the Cold War, a unipolar system. The Chinese term
we would use for that is 王权
[wangquan]. After the Western Zhou Dynasty was the Spring and Autumn period
there were some thirty countries within the realm, which by the Warring States
period was reduced to seven, before being united as one country in the Qin Dynasty
[in the third century BC]. This history is known by every Chinese kid.
So
drawing a parallel between Chinese history and contemporary world politics, after
the Cold War we entered a unipolar world, resembling the Zhou Dynasty. Where is
it moving? Many people are talking about multipolarization. Multipolarization
means a transfer from a unipolar configuration to a multipolar one, similar to
the transfer from the Western Zhou domination to the Spring and Autumn period. Thus,
I turned to considering what happened in that period, and what we might learn
from the thinkers of that time. I didn’t do a historical study, I didn’t study
the facts, I only studied the thought: how did the people in that time think about the world?
drawing a parallel between Chinese history and contemporary world politics, after
the Cold War we entered a unipolar world, resembling the Zhou Dynasty. Where is
it moving? Many people are talking about multipolarization. Multipolarization
means a transfer from a unipolar configuration to a multipolar one, similar to
the transfer from the Western Zhou domination to the Spring and Autumn period. Thus,
I turned to considering what happened in that period, and what we might learn
from the thinkers of that time. I didn’t do a historical study, I didn’t study
the facts, I only studied the thought: how did the people in that time think about the world?
The
third reason for me to study the ancient writings is very personal. Because I’m
Chinese, my Western cultural background is lacking. It is difficult for me to
understand that culture, because I did not grow up with it. But I’m familiar
with the Chinese culture: I know international politics today are very
different than two thousand years ago, but I also find some similarities
between now and then. Perhaps we can get some important resources from ancient
Chinese thought, to help us to develop theory—to help us to surpass Alexander
Wendt. And recently, our group is growing. We have more and more people working
to create theories of international relations by studying ancient Chinese
thought. You may have noticed that we are publishing more and more theoretical
articles in the CJIP many of which have more powerful explanatory power than
that of Alexander Wendt.
third reason for me to study the ancient writings is very personal. Because I’m
Chinese, my Western cultural background is lacking. It is difficult for me to
understand that culture, because I did not grow up with it. But I’m familiar
with the Chinese culture: I know international politics today are very
different than two thousand years ago, but I also find some similarities
between now and then. Perhaps we can get some important resources from ancient
Chinese thought, to help us to develop theory—to help us to surpass Alexander
Wendt. And recently, our group is growing. We have more and more people working
to create theories of international relations by studying ancient Chinese
thought. You may have noticed that we are publishing more and more theoretical
articles in the CJIP many of which have more powerful explanatory power than
that of Alexander Wendt.
What would a student
need to become a specialist in IR or understand the world in a global way?
need to become a specialist in IR or understand the world in a global way?
I
like this question. There are two points I’d like to make. Once I encouraged
some Indian scholars to follow our suit, to study IR from the perspective of
their ancient history and their archaeology. India actually has a strong
tradition of political thought dating back to ancient times, but now you find
that the dominating IR theories are all based on Western culture. I think if we
want IR theories to become truly rich and develop more universal values, we
should encourage these scholars and students to take a deeper look into their
own culture, knowledge, philosophy, and political theory, to enrich this field,
as Amitev Acharya (Theory Talk #42)
and others have argued, because this kind of study is severely lacking. Theoretical
studies of international relations tend to rest mainly on European
philosophies. Too few IR scholars read Chinese philosophy. It is much the same
situation in India. The Indians have a very long history. So the Indian
students, and also Latin American students, can bring their traditional thought
into IR theory. I believe that this can deeply enrich and develop modern IR
theory.
like this question. There are two points I’d like to make. Once I encouraged
some Indian scholars to follow our suit, to study IR from the perspective of
their ancient history and their archaeology. India actually has a strong
tradition of political thought dating back to ancient times, but now you find
that the dominating IR theories are all based on Western culture. I think if we
want IR theories to become truly rich and develop more universal values, we
should encourage these scholars and students to take a deeper look into their
own culture, knowledge, philosophy, and political theory, to enrich this field,
as Amitev Acharya (Theory Talk #42)
and others have argued, because this kind of study is severely lacking. Theoretical
studies of international relations tend to rest mainly on European
philosophies. Too few IR scholars read Chinese philosophy. It is much the same
situation in India. The Indians have a very long history. So the Indian
students, and also Latin American students, can bring their traditional thought
into IR theory. I believe that this can deeply enrich and develop modern IR
theory.
Second,
and this is a more methodological point, I personally adhere to the scientific
methodology, so I encourage my students to do positivist studies following the
scientific method, but I do not oppose other methodologies. If they can develop
a solid theory in another way I will support them in their endeavor. Personally,
I believe at this moment that the scientific method is more efficient than any
other, because it helps make theory clearer. Especially nowadays, the social
sciences cannot just study the nature of relationships between humans, societies
or nations, and conduct qualitative studies, but must implement quantitative methodologies.
That means we need to study differences in degrees, not only differences in
nature.
and this is a more methodological point, I personally adhere to the scientific
methodology, so I encourage my students to do positivist studies following the
scientific method, but I do not oppose other methodologies. If they can develop
a solid theory in another way I will support them in their endeavor. Personally,
I believe at this moment that the scientific method is more efficient than any
other, because it helps make theory clearer. Especially nowadays, the social
sciences cannot just study the nature of relationships between humans, societies
or nations, and conduct qualitative studies, but must implement quantitative methodologies.
That means we need to study differences in degrees, not only differences in
nature.
In your recent book Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese
Power (Princeton University Press, 2011), you differentiate between hegemonic
power and what has been translated as ‘humane authority’. What is the
difference?
Power (Princeton University Press, 2011), you differentiate between hegemonic
power and what has been translated as ‘humane authority’. What is the
difference?
The
United States is a typical hegemon. Its conduct of foreign affairs is characterized
by a double standard: a hegemon presents norms as the principle for dealing
with its friends, but power politics as a principle for dealing with its
enemies. A humane authority, by contrast, should have a coherent principle underpinning
its behavior. That means it will make a judgment on whether a state is at fault
or not, according to international norms
rather than their personal relationship. ‘Because you’re a friend, you can do
wrong. Because you are my enemy, no matter what you do, I am opposed to you.’
That is the essence of a hegemon, but not a humane authority. Humane authority works
differently by making judgments according to principles, unanimous criteria, and
not using a double standard. Currently we cannot identify any major powers as a
humane authority, but I do believe China ought to be this kind of state.
United States is a typical hegemon. Its conduct of foreign affairs is characterized
by a double standard: a hegemon presents norms as the principle for dealing
with its friends, but power politics as a principle for dealing with its
enemies. A humane authority, by contrast, should have a coherent principle underpinning
its behavior. That means it will make a judgment on whether a state is at fault
or not, according to international norms
rather than their personal relationship. ‘Because you’re a friend, you can do
wrong. Because you are my enemy, no matter what you do, I am opposed to you.’
That is the essence of a hegemon, but not a humane authority. Humane authority works
differently by making judgments according to principles, unanimous criteria, and
not using a double standard. Currently we cannot identify any major powers as a
humane authority, but I do believe China ought to be this kind of state.
So
what is important in becoming a humane authority? Of course, transparency is a
very important issue here. If a government heavily relies on secret diplomacy,
you can hardly expect it to play the role of a humane authority. Moreover, transparency
is important not only internationally, but also at a domestic level. However, I
think that it is important to note transparency is important, but not crucial.
The core of a humane authority lies in credibility. Credibility means that you
keep your promises and that your actions are consistent with your words.
what is important in becoming a humane authority? Of course, transparency is a
very important issue here. If a government heavily relies on secret diplomacy,
you can hardly expect it to play the role of a humane authority. Moreover, transparency
is important not only internationally, but also at a domestic level. However, I
think that it is important to note transparency is important, but not crucial.
The core of a humane authority lies in credibility. Credibility means that you
keep your promises and that your actions are consistent with your words.
Let
me give an example. At this point in time they are debating in China whether we should abandon the non-alliance principle, which stipulates
we do not make promises to anyone. Without offering any promises, there is no
way to test your credibility. You promise nothing, so you do not need to meet
any specific expectations. You can never know whether such a country has
credibility or not, whether that country is reliable or not. If China wants to
be a world power and play the role of the leading power then China has to make
alliances. Without alliances you can never have close relations with other
countries, and certainly can never have more good friends than the US. The US
makes alliances, China doesn’t. You can’t find any country in the world that
says, ‘we have more close friends than the United States,’ because there is no
country that makes more alliances. Secondly, because the US makes alliances and
makes promises to its allies, we can know how reliable or unreliable they are. When
they don’t keep their promises their allies aren’t happy.
me give an example. At this point in time they are debating in China whether we should abandon the non-alliance principle, which stipulates
we do not make promises to anyone. Without offering any promises, there is no
way to test your credibility. You promise nothing, so you do not need to meet
any specific expectations. You can never know whether such a country has
credibility or not, whether that country is reliable or not. If China wants to
be a world power and play the role of the leading power then China has to make
alliances. Without alliances you can never have close relations with other
countries, and certainly can never have more good friends than the US. The US
makes alliances, China doesn’t. You can’t find any country in the world that
says, ‘we have more close friends than the United States,’ because there is no
country that makes more alliances. Secondly, because the US makes alliances and
makes promises to its allies, we can know how reliable or unreliable they are. When
they don’t keep their promises their allies aren’t happy.
That’s
why I argue that at this moment for China to become a humane authority, it
needs to consider giving up its non-alliance principle. China started its
non-alliance principle in 1982 contrasting greatly from the ideas put forth in
the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.
Previously, China had made alliances with many countries all over the world.
why I argue that at this moment for China to become a humane authority, it
needs to consider giving up its non-alliance principle. China started its
non-alliance principle in 1982 contrasting greatly from the ideas put forth in
the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.
Previously, China had made alliances with many countries all over the world.
You strongly align
yourself with the Realist school of IR, which underscores national
self-interest and prioritizes national interest and security over ideology and
moral concerns, and indeed you accept that a ‘true kingship’ state must be
strongly militarily. And yet a core theme of your book is ‘moral authority’
without military force. How do you reconcile these principles?
yourself with the Realist school of IR, which underscores national
self-interest and prioritizes national interest and security over ideology and
moral concerns, and indeed you accept that a ‘true kingship’ state must be
strongly militarily. And yet a core theme of your book is ‘moral authority’
without military force. How do you reconcile these principles?
I
should explain first of all that when I speak of the three different types of
international leadership—tyranny, hegemony, and humane authority—all three
types of leadership are based on military power. The main difference is in
terms of their morality and the principles that govern their behavior. Even a
humane authority leadership needs the support of military power.
should explain first of all that when I speak of the three different types of
international leadership—tyranny, hegemony, and humane authority—all three
types of leadership are based on military power. The main difference is in
terms of their morality and the principles that govern their behavior. Even a
humane authority leadership needs the support of military power.
If
people have argued that I make a contradictory argument in my book, it is because
people misunderstand realism. In realism, we consider morality to be an
important part of power; it is an essential element of capabilities. When
realists talk about capabilities, strength and power, they consider morality
very important. Morgenthau is very typical in this regard: of his sixprinciples of political realism two are about morality!
people have argued that I make a contradictory argument in my book, it is because
people misunderstand realism. In realism, we consider morality to be an
important part of power; it is an essential element of capabilities. When
realists talk about capabilities, strength and power, they consider morality
very important. Morgenthau is very typical in this regard: of his sixprinciples of political realism two are about morality!
I
build my argument based on Morgenthau’s writing on morality. First of all,
morality can provide legitimacy for you to use force. Without morality, you use
force illegally and undermine the strength of your military force, and you also
make it very difficult to achieve political goals. Secondly—and realists realize
this very well—morality should be both constant and specific. An unspecific
moral code provides an excuse for using violence and going to war, making such
morality meaningless. Within realism, morality should be concrete, not simply
an abstract concept.
build my argument based on Morgenthau’s writing on morality. First of all,
morality can provide legitimacy for you to use force. Without morality, you use
force illegally and undermine the strength of your military force, and you also
make it very difficult to achieve political goals. Secondly—and realists realize
this very well—morality should be both constant and specific. An unspecific
moral code provides an excuse for using violence and going to war, making such
morality meaningless. Within realism, morality should be concrete, not simply
an abstract concept.
Finally,
it is important to consider the two most important variables in realism: power (or
capabilities), and interest. People often misinterpret realism as being
concerned only with economic interest. In fact, we define interests in a
comprehensive way, and not as narrowly as only applied to the economic field!
Political interests are more important for us than economic interests.
it is important to consider the two most important variables in realism: power (or
capabilities), and interest. People often misinterpret realism as being
concerned only with economic interest. In fact, we define interests in a
comprehensive way, and not as narrowly as only applied to the economic field!
Political interests are more important for us than economic interests.
And that is the point of
your criticism of the Chinese government, whose current focus is economic
development.
your criticism of the Chinese government, whose current focus is economic
development.
Yes.
And which school of IR theory gave the first priority to economic interests?
Liberalism. Liberalism believes that economic interests should enjoy the first
priority of the country’s macro-policy, but in realism, economic interests are
a secondary concern. National security interests should take precedence over
economic concerns. Because we as realist view national security as paramount,
we must be concerned with the moral character of our actions. If security
interests are the most important concern then there should not be a
contradiction of our policy with morality. Morality helps guide a nation’s
principles and even how and what national security policy it implements.
And which school of IR theory gave the first priority to economic interests?
Liberalism. Liberalism believes that economic interests should enjoy the first
priority of the country’s macro-policy, but in realism, economic interests are
a secondary concern. National security interests should take precedence over
economic concerns. Because we as realist view national security as paramount,
we must be concerned with the moral character of our actions. If security
interests are the most important concern then there should not be a
contradiction of our policy with morality. Morality helps guide a nation’s
principles and even how and what national security policy it implements.
You speak of conflict
repeatedly, and you started our conversation saying that there was competition
and potential conflict between China and the United States. To what extent do
you see the rise of China necessarily replacing the US as the predominant
global power?
repeatedly, and you started our conversation saying that there was competition
and potential conflict between China and the United States. To what extent do
you see the rise of China necessarily replacing the US as the predominant
global power?
First
of all, we realists don’t believe the world can be harmonious. Even at the
domestic level it is difficult to achieve complete harmony. Look at China as an
example: the conflict between different social groups is serious; it is clear
China has not achieved a harmonious society. Yet again, you can hardly say the
US is a harmonious society! If you cannot even make a country internally
harmonious, how can you make the international system harmonious? The Chinese
government uses the term ‘harmonious’ a lot—we could say it’s a concept like
the Kantian idea of ‘perpetual peace’: it’s desirable, but that doesn’t mean
you can achieve it. So instead of deploying such terms, it makes sense to speak
of a less violent, less conflictive environment. So we realist commonly refer
to less violence and less war as a desirable outcome, but we never talk about
harmony.
of all, we realists don’t believe the world can be harmonious. Even at the
domestic level it is difficult to achieve complete harmony. Look at China as an
example: the conflict between different social groups is serious; it is clear
China has not achieved a harmonious society. Yet again, you can hardly say the
US is a harmonious society! If you cannot even make a country internally
harmonious, how can you make the international system harmonious? The Chinese
government uses the term ‘harmonious’ a lot—we could say it’s a concept like
the Kantian idea of ‘perpetual peace’: it’s desirable, but that doesn’t mean
you can achieve it. So instead of deploying such terms, it makes sense to speak
of a less violent, less conflictive environment. So we realist commonly refer
to less violence and less war as a desirable outcome, but we never talk about
harmony.
The
second thing is that in realism even if we do accept that term, we question the
process: how might the world move closer towards a harmonious society? You need
to develop new international norms. Before we argue what norms are more
helpful, at minimum we have to admit that the norms of today cannot achieve
harmony on a global scale. Reality tells us that the current norms are not good
enough. We need to reform and create new international norms to govern the behavior
of all nation states in order to make a relatively harmonious, or less
conflictive international society.
second thing is that in realism even if we do accept that term, we question the
process: how might the world move closer towards a harmonious society? You need
to develop new international norms. Before we argue what norms are more
helpful, at minimum we have to admit that the norms of today cannot achieve
harmony on a global scale. Reality tells us that the current norms are not good
enough. We need to reform and create new international norms to govern the behavior
of all nation states in order to make a relatively harmonious, or less
conflictive international society.
Related
to the topic of international norms, I as a realist believe is that no country
is able to create a world government. On the one hand you cannot have a world government,
on the other hand every power is greedy for leadership, which inevitably leads
to a fight for power. How can this be addressed? You need norms. So you are
looking at the gap between the desirable world government and the reality of
the war among major powers, where norms are needed—not to govern, but to
constrain behavior, to make states relatively peaceful. Today’s international
norms cannot meet the goal of relative peace and stability; they may fulfill
some other functions, but are insufficient. So when I talk about humane
authority, I mean that such authority should develop or create those much-needed
new norms. To create new international norms there are three approaches: ‘Make
yourself an example’, that means, make yourself a model for the world. Second: ‘punish
those who violate the norms’; and thirdly: ‘protect and encourage those who
abide by the norms’. If you cannot achieve your goal just by setting an
example, then the second approach is acceptable.
to the topic of international norms, I as a realist believe is that no country
is able to create a world government. On the one hand you cannot have a world government,
on the other hand every power is greedy for leadership, which inevitably leads
to a fight for power. How can this be addressed? You need norms. So you are
looking at the gap between the desirable world government and the reality of
the war among major powers, where norms are needed—not to govern, but to
constrain behavior, to make states relatively peaceful. Today’s international
norms cannot meet the goal of relative peace and stability; they may fulfill
some other functions, but are insufficient. So when I talk about humane
authority, I mean that such authority should develop or create those much-needed
new norms. To create new international norms there are three approaches: ‘Make
yourself an example’, that means, make yourself a model for the world. Second: ‘punish
those who violate the norms’; and thirdly: ‘protect and encourage those who
abide by the norms’. If you cannot achieve your goal just by setting an
example, then the second approach is acceptable.
In addition to the line
of thought you are developing at Tsinghua University, there are a small handful
of prominent Chinese scholars in the field. Are there any unifying ideas in the
IR debates in China?
of thought you are developing at Tsinghua University, there are a small handful
of prominent Chinese scholars in the field. Are there any unifying ideas in the
IR debates in China?
I
think there are two major thinkers that matter here: Qin Yaqing and Zhao
Tingyang. Actually I think there is some similarity between Qin Yaqing (Theory Talk #45)
and myself, and what Qin and me share is that we do not have a connection with
Zhao Tingyang,
because Zhao is a philosopher and his books are about philosophy, rather than
about the real world. So although Western scholars take his work very
seriously, as a part of China’s IR thinking, in China we don’t agree. We don’t
think his writing is in any way related to IR, it’s a kind of philosophical
exercise. In fact I find it quite strange that Western scholars consider his
work as part of the China IR schools.
think there are two major thinkers that matter here: Qin Yaqing and Zhao
Tingyang. Actually I think there is some similarity between Qin Yaqing (Theory Talk #45)
and myself, and what Qin and me share is that we do not have a connection with
Zhao Tingyang,
because Zhao is a philosopher and his books are about philosophy, rather than
about the real world. So although Western scholars take his work very
seriously, as a part of China’s IR thinking, in China we don’t agree. We don’t
think his writing is in any way related to IR, it’s a kind of philosophical
exercise. In fact I find it quite strange that Western scholars consider his
work as part of the China IR schools.
As
for Qin, we are very close, but we have different approaches. The common thing
we share is that we feel the need to borrow ancient Chinese thought as a
resource to develop our theory. But Qin believes that we should develop a kind
of theory that is typically Chinese, and that is not my view. We don’t need
something very Chinese; we just need to build something that is popular throughout
the world. Secondly, Qin has tried to study the question of a specifically
Chinese IR theory from within: he takes relationships between states as an
independent variable, which is very different from me. I take international
relations as a dependent variable: I think relationships are a result. It’s not
because of a relationship that a situation garners certain characteristics,
rather it is the inverse: because of a situation we have a relationship. I work
out how to deal with power, how to deal with norms, how to deal with interests,
and this is how to make the relationship harmonious. Qin develops ‘relationship
theory’. If you look at the details, you will also find much we have in common.
For instance, his method of study is also very scientific; both of us use the
scientific method. On that basis, it is easy for us to communicate with each
other.
for Qin, we are very close, but we have different approaches. The common thing
we share is that we feel the need to borrow ancient Chinese thought as a
resource to develop our theory. But Qin believes that we should develop a kind
of theory that is typically Chinese, and that is not my view. We don’t need
something very Chinese; we just need to build something that is popular throughout
the world. Secondly, Qin has tried to study the question of a specifically
Chinese IR theory from within: he takes relationships between states as an
independent variable, which is very different from me. I take international
relations as a dependent variable: I think relationships are a result. It’s not
because of a relationship that a situation garners certain characteristics,
rather it is the inverse: because of a situation we have a relationship. I work
out how to deal with power, how to deal with norms, how to deal with interests,
and this is how to make the relationship harmonious. Qin develops ‘relationship
theory’. If you look at the details, you will also find much we have in common.
For instance, his method of study is also very scientific; both of us use the
scientific method. On that basis, it is easy for us to communicate with each
other.
How much does IR theory
influence policy? Or, to make that more concrete, to what extent do you believe
your thinking has an influence on government policy? You have noted that there
are no independent policy think tanks in China, and yet Tsinghua University and
other institutions do have some considerable influence.
influence policy? Or, to make that more concrete, to what extent do you believe
your thinking has an influence on government policy? You have noted that there
are no independent policy think tanks in China, and yet Tsinghua University and
other institutions do have some considerable influence.
I
think there are three ways in which scholars’ opinions may influence China’s
foreign policy making. First of all, there are academic publications like Wang
Jisi’s recent report ‘China’s Search for a Grand Strategy’,
and my own articles. This stimulates debate as policy makers read our articles
and gain insight into our ideas. The second factor consists of internal
meetings: policy bureaus always call on scholars to join meetings and there are
discussions. Through these discussions they will be influenced by the universities.
A third important factor is the individual contact some of us have with policy
makers.
think there are three ways in which scholars’ opinions may influence China’s
foreign policy making. First of all, there are academic publications like Wang
Jisi’s recent report ‘China’s Search for a Grand Strategy’,
and my own articles. This stimulates debate as policy makers read our articles
and gain insight into our ideas. The second factor consists of internal
meetings: policy bureaus always call on scholars to join meetings and there are
discussions. Through these discussions they will be influenced by the universities.
A third important factor is the individual contact some of us have with policy
makers.
Earlier
this year we held a forum to discuss why the term ‘reform’ can never be applied
to China’s foreign policy. The term reform has been very popular in China, having
been applied to the economy, to medicine, to education—to pretty much
everything. However, ‘reform’ has not been applied to foreign policy. However,
my personal take on this is that whatever the differences may be among scholars
in our field, they all agree that we need reform of the current Chinese foreign
policy. The current foreign policy has a problem, and needs reform to become
more efficient. People may have different views, but the need for reform is
unanimously accepted within the scholarly community. This is my hope for the
new government. I don’t know what kind of policy they are going to adopt, but
one thing is clear, they cannot continue the current policy. In the early
1990s, the late paramount leader Deng Xiaoping gave guidance to China’s foreign
and security policy apparatus that, collectively, has come to be known as the
‘24 character strategy’: ‘observe calmly; secure our position; cope with
affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a
low profile; and never claim leadership’. Yet in my view, ‘Keeping a low
profile’, a key element of Deng Xiaoping’s 24-character strategy from the
1990’s, is out of date.
this year we held a forum to discuss why the term ‘reform’ can never be applied
to China’s foreign policy. The term reform has been very popular in China, having
been applied to the economy, to medicine, to education—to pretty much
everything. However, ‘reform’ has not been applied to foreign policy. However,
my personal take on this is that whatever the differences may be among scholars
in our field, they all agree that we need reform of the current Chinese foreign
policy. The current foreign policy has a problem, and needs reform to become
more efficient. People may have different views, but the need for reform is
unanimously accepted within the scholarly community. This is my hope for the
new government. I don’t know what kind of policy they are going to adopt, but
one thing is clear, they cannot continue the current policy. In the early
1990s, the late paramount leader Deng Xiaoping gave guidance to China’s foreign
and security policy apparatus that, collectively, has come to be known as the
‘24 character strategy’: ‘observe calmly; secure our position; cope with
affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a
low profile; and never claim leadership’. Yet in my view, ‘Keeping a low
profile’, a key element of Deng Xiaoping’s 24-character strategy from the
1990’s, is out of date.
To what extent can China
take a leading position globally?
take a leading position globally?
I
know what you want to address, but I think most foreigners ignore and
misunderstand what the Chinese policy makers really are concerned with. Western
countries wonder what kind of leadership China is going to provide. Actually,
this is very strange for a Chinese policy maker: ‘wait a minute, our policy is
that we won’t provide any leadership. We don’t want to take on the leadership!’
For China it is not a question of what type of leadership we might want to
provide. What I discuss in my book is far from what the Chinese government is
actually thinking about. What they discuss is whether we should take on a
leadership role in the first place. So from my understanding, the debate for
the next government is not what policy we should adopt or what kind of
international norms we should offer. The question is: should China offer
international norms? Should China take on international responsibility? Should
China become the leader? Should China become a superpower? Before we discuss
how we might go about leading we must answer these questions.
know what you want to address, but I think most foreigners ignore and
misunderstand what the Chinese policy makers really are concerned with. Western
countries wonder what kind of leadership China is going to provide. Actually,
this is very strange for a Chinese policy maker: ‘wait a minute, our policy is
that we won’t provide any leadership. We don’t want to take on the leadership!’
For China it is not a question of what type of leadership we might want to
provide. What I discuss in my book is far from what the Chinese government is
actually thinking about. What they discuss is whether we should take on a
leadership role in the first place. So from my understanding, the debate for
the next government is not what policy we should adopt or what kind of
international norms we should offer. The question is: should China offer
international norms? Should China take on international responsibility? Should
China become the leader? Should China become a superpower? Before we discuss
how we might go about leading we must answer these questions.
Yan Xuetong is Dean of
the Institute of Modern International Relations at Tsinghua University in
Beijing and the Chief Editor of The Chinese Journal of International
Politics (Oxford University Press). Professor Yan received his PhD in
political science from the University of California, Berkeley in 1992. In
2008, Yan was named as one of the world’s Top 100 public intellectuals by the
American journal Foreign Policy. Yan has published extensively, most
recently Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern
Chinese Power, Princeton University Press 2011.
the Institute of Modern International Relations at Tsinghua University in
Beijing and the Chief Editor of The Chinese Journal of International
Politics (Oxford University Press). Professor Yan received his PhD in
political science from the University of California, Berkeley in 1992. In
2008, Yan was named as one of the world’s Top 100 public intellectuals by the
American journal Foreign Policy. Yan has published extensively, most
recently Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern
Chinese Power, Princeton University Press 2011.
- Read
the Introduction to Xuetong’s Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese
Power here (pdf)
- Read Xuetong’s How China Can Defeat America (New York
Times, 2011) here (html)
- Read
Xuetong’s The Rise of China in China’s
Eyes (Journal of Contemporary China, 2001), here (pdf)
- Read
Xuetong’s Analysis of China’s National
Interest (full book, 1999) here (pdf)
